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1. Introduction
Research into number theoretic questions concerning elliptic curves was originally pursued mainly
for aesthetic reasons. But in recent decades such questions have become important in several applied
areas, including coding theory, pseudorandom number generation, and especially cryptography.
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782 A.H. Koblitz et al. / Journal of Number Theory 131 (2011) 781–814The ﬁrst use of elliptic curves in cryptography was H.W. Lenstra’s elliptic curve factoring algo-
rithm [70]. Inspired by this unexpected application of elliptic curves, in 1985 N. Koblitz [54] and
V. Miller [80] independently proposed using the group of points on an elliptic curve deﬁned over a
ﬁnite ﬁeld in discrete log cryptosystems. The primary advantage that elliptic curve systems have over
systems based on either integer factorization or the discrete log problem in the multiplicative group
of a ﬁnite ﬁeld is the absence of a subexponential-time algorithm (such as those of index calculus
type) that could ﬁnd discrete logs in these groups, provided that the curve and the underlying ﬁeld
are suitably chosen. Consequently, one can use an elliptic curve group that is smaller in size while
maintaining the same level of security. In many situations the result is smaller key sizes, bandwidth
savings, and faster implementations, features which are especially attractive for security applications
in devices where computational power and integrated circuit space are limited, such as smart cards
and cell phones.
In 2005 the U.S. National Security Agency posted a paper [87] titled “The Case for Elliptic Curve
Cryptography,” in which they recommended that industry “take advantage of the past 30 years of
public key research and analysis and move from ﬁrst generation public key algorithms and on to
elliptic curves.” The NSA commented:
The best assured group of new public key techniques is built on the arithmetic of elliptic curves.
This paper will outline a case for moving to elliptic curves as a foundation for future Internet
security. This case will be based on both the relative security offered by elliptic curves. . . and
the relative performance of these algorithms. While at current security levels elliptic curves do
not offer signiﬁcant beneﬁts over existing public key algorithms, as one scales security upwards
over time to meet the evolving threat posed by eavesdroppers and hackers with access to greater
computing resources, elliptic curves begin to offer dramatic savings over the old, ﬁrst generation
techniques.
In the present paper we give an overview of the history of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), focus-
ing on the controversies over the security of ECC. This story can be seen as a case study in the history
of technology. We start by describing what we call the Ideal Model of research and development
in cryptography. The subsequent sections examine to what extent our observations and experiences
conform to or contradict that Ideal Model. We then summarize some of the viewpoints found in a
subﬁeld of history and sociology of science called Social Construction of Technology,1 and ask whether
those ideas can contribute to a better understanding of the history of ECC.
2. The ideal model
Although not everyone working in cryptography necessarily believes in the validity of what we
shall call the Ideal Model of research and development, the general outline given below is a fair
representation of the image that cryptographers hope to project to the outside world — especially to
laypeople, business customers, and scientists and engineers in related ﬁelds.
1. Security always at center stage. The most fundamental feature of any type of cryptographic technol-
ogy is its security — its resistance to being compromised by an adversary. Although functionality and
eﬃciency are also important — and, for example, users may choose to make do with smaller parame-
ters for increased eﬃciency if they need only short-term security — the desire to speed up encryption
and signature and improve user interface is never a valid reason to lose sight of the basic question
of security. In addition, there is a broad realization that complacency is the enemy of security. Hence,
the security of the protocols and the underlying mathematical problems is constantly reevaluated in
light of new research.
1 Often referred to by the acronym SCOT, not to be confused with SCOS (Social Construction of Science) or STOC (one of the
most prestigious annual conferences in computer science). In this paper in the interest of readability we shall eschew the use
of abbreviations and acronyms, with only a few exceptions, such as RSA and ECC.
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when they depended on the intuition of artisans. Rather than a craft or art, cryptography has truly
become a science. The techniques of “provable security” allow marketers of cryptographic protocols to
give ironclad guarantees that broad classes of attacks — and these include even attacks that no one
has yet imagined — are impossible provided that certain widely believed mathematical assumptions
are correct. In addition, the increasing use of automatic software-checkers and theorem-provers gives
further reason to expect that human mistakes and failings will play an ever-diminishing role in the
evaluation and selection of cryptographic products.
3. Tradition of vigorous debate. The cryptographic community expects and welcomes vigorous debate
on the merits of competing systems and methods of analysis. Because of the large interests at stake,
these discussions might be heated at times, but the participants understand the need for sharp debate,
and so do not take disagreements personally.
4. Special institutions to ensure careful vetting. Although, as in other branches of science, cryptographers
have the usual peer review system for academic journals, the most important guarantors of quality
control are the program committees that choose papers for presentation at major conferences2 and
the accredited industrial standards bodies that evaluate speciﬁc systems and recommend their de-
ployment with suggested parameters.
5. Survival of the ﬁttest. As a result of the checks and balances that are part and parcel of cryptographic
research and development, the technology that emerges as the “winner” has passed a stringent series
of tests leading to “survival of the ﬁttest.” In that sense it can be regarded as intrinsically the best of
the alternatives available at the time.
3. The mid-1980s: Discrete logs and factoring
At the heart of any type of public key cryptography is a “one-way” mathematical process or func-
tion for which the inverse cannot feasibly be computed. In the famous RSA system the process is to
take two very large randomly-generated prime numbers and multiply them together. In a classical
Diﬃe–Hellman system the operation is exponentiation in a ﬁnite ﬁeld. In the former case the inverse
process is integer factorization. In the latter type of system the inverse is called the discrete logarithm
in the ﬁnite ﬁeld.
More precisely, let G be a subgroup of prime order n in the multiplicative group of the ﬁeld of q
elements Fq , where q = p f is a prime power. (For simplicity we shall generally assume that G has
prime order; this is usually the case in cryptographic applications.) Given a generator g ∈ G (i.e.,
a non-identity element), the discrete log problem in G is the problem, given y ∈ G , of ﬁnding an integer
x (mod n) such that y = gx .
The simplest example of a Diﬃe–Hellman system is a basic key agreement scheme that works as
follows. Suppose that Alice and Bob wish to agree on a shared key, which will be a random element
of G . Alice chooses a secret integer a (mod n) and sends Bob the group element A = ga; Bob chooses a
secret integer b (mod n) and sends Alice the group element B = gb . The shared key is then gab , which
Alice can compute as Ba and Bob can compute as Ab . An eavesdropper who monitors the exchange
of information has the task of computing gab knowing g , ga , and gb . This problem is known as the
Diﬃe–Hellman problem in the group G . The Diﬃe–Hellman problem can be immediately solved if one
knows how to ﬁnd discrete logs in G , and it is thought to be essentially equivalent to the discrete log
problem.
3.1. Index calculus
The most eﬃcient algorithms to solve both the problem of factoring the product of two large
primes and the problem of ﬁnding the discrete log in a ﬁnite ﬁeld were — and still are — of “index
2 The vast majority of papers in cryptography are published in refereed conference proceedings, not in journals.
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log in a prime ﬁeld. For ease of exposition we will temporarily suppose that G is the entire group F∗p
rather than a prime order subgroup, so that n = p − 1. Let g be a generator of F∗p . Given y ∈ F∗p , we
want to ﬁnd x such that y ≡ gx (mod p).
To do that we ﬁrst choose a “factor base” consisting of the ﬁrst s primes, where s is chosen in a
certain optimal way so as to minimize running time. The ﬁrst part of the algorithm, which does not
depend on y, consists in ﬁnding the discrete logs of the factor base. We choose some random value ui
less than n and compute the least positive residue of gui (mod p). If that residue has a prime factor
greater than the sth prime, we make another choice of ui . Finally we get a “smooth” residue that has
no large prime factor, at which point we can write
gui ≡
s∏
j=1
p
αi j
j (mod p),
and hence
ui ≡
s∑
j=1
αi j x j (mod n),
where x j is the discrete log of p j . When we get more than s such congruences we can ﬁnd the
unknowns x j by linear algebra over Z/nZ. Once we have the discrete logs of the p j , the rest of
the algorithm proceeds quickly. We choose random values of u until we get one for which the least
positive residue of gu y has no prime factor greater than ps , so that we can write
gu y ≡
s∏
j=1
p
β j
j (mod p).
We conclude that the desired discrete log is
x ≡
(
s∑
j=1
β jx j
)
− u (mod n).
In the early 1980s the best index calculus algorithms for either factorization or discrete log in a
ﬁnite ﬁeld had asymptotic running time of the form exp(k1/2+), where k is, respectively, the bitlength
of the number to be factored or the bitlength of the size of the ﬁnite ﬁeld. An important exception —
which turned out to be a harbinger of things to come — was Don Coppersmith’s algorithm [18] for
ﬁnding discrete logs in the ﬁnite ﬁelds F2k . His algorithm had running time of the form exp(k
1/3+).3
After the demise of the early knapsack cryptosystems (which were proposed in the late 1970s
and broken within a few years), most cryptographic protocols were based on either factorization or
discrete logs in a ﬁnite ﬁeld. This was a little disconcerting, because it appeared that, despite the
superﬁcial dissimilarity between the two problems, the most eﬃcient algorithms were very similar.
In such circumstances one might speculate that a major advance in solving one of the two supposedly
“hard” problems would soon be followed by a similar improvement in methods to solve the other one.
(And in fact a few years later, when the number ﬁeld sieve was developed for factoring, it was soon
followed by a version that ﬁnds discrete logs in a prime ﬁeld [36].) In that sense the two problems are
not really independent, and it might have seemed that cryptographers were putting all their security
eggs in one basket.
3 In discussing running times of attacks on number theoretic problems, we shall not distinguish between heuristic and proven
time estimates.
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In 1984 Hendrik Lenstra circulated a preprint describing a new factorization method. Like the
index calculus algorithms available at the time, it also has running time exp(k1/2+) to factor a k-
bit integer, but it has several features that mark a radical departure from the other algorithms with
that running time. First, it is not an index calculus algorithm, and it seems that no algorithm similar
to Lenstra’s can be developed for the discrete log problem in a ﬁnite ﬁeld. Second, although it is
not more eﬃcient than index calculus for factoring an RSA-type integer — that is, a product of two
primes of roughly the same size — it has the advantage that its running time depends on the size of
the smallest prime factor, not on the size of the number itself. This was later put to use in factoring
other types of numbers that arise in cryptography.
But the most striking feature of Lenstra’s factoring algorithm [70] was that it used elliptic curves.
This was the ﬁrst application of elliptic curves in cryptography, and it set in motion a process of
ﬁnding cryptographic uses for many types of “pure” mathematics — especially arithmetic algebraic
geometry — that had never before been studied for this purpose.
In 1985 V. Miller [80] and N. Koblitz [54] proposed a completely different cryptographic use of
elliptic curves: constructing Diﬃe–Hellman type protocols using the group of points of an elliptic
curve deﬁned over a ﬁnite ﬁeld rather than the multiplicative group of a ﬁnite ﬁeld. Let E be given
by a Weierstrass equation
y2 + a1xy + a3 y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x+ a6,
with ai ∈ Fq . The groups used in ECC are the prime order subgroups G of the Fq-points of E . In the
setting of the elliptic curve group law, which is customarily written in additive notation, the discrete
log problem asks: given P , Q ∈ G , ﬁnd x (mod n) such that Q = xP .
The most important reason for considering ECC was that it seemed unlikely that index calculus
could be adapted for use in an elliptic curve group. The reason is that in order to apply the idea
of index calculus, one needs a set of “small” elements (the “factor base”) such that a reasonable
proportion of the remaining elements can be eﬃciently written in terms of the factor base. In [80]
Miller made an argument using the Néron–Tate height function (see also [99], which contains a much
more detailed discussion) that if one tries to use the most natural notion of “smallness” one will ﬁnd
that there are very few points of bounded size, not nearly enough to form a factor base for index
calculus.
In the early years of ECC a popular choice of curves for expository purposes was the equation
y2 = x3−x deﬁned over a prime ﬁeld Fp . If p ≡ 3 (mod 4) — this is known as the supersingular case —
it is an easy exercise to show that the group order is p + 1. One can then quickly ﬁnd a p such that
this group has a very large prime order subgroup. The procedure is similar to the following method
for ﬁnding a prime ﬁeld whose multiplicative group has a prime order subgroup of smallest possible
index 2. Namely, let n be a Sophie Germain prime, and set p = 2n + 1. Then F∗p has a subgroup of
prime order n = (p − 1)/2. In the elliptic curve case choose a prime n for which p = 4n− 1 is prime;
then the group of Fp-points on y2 = x3 − x is the product of the group of 4 points of order 2 and a
subgroup of prime order n = (p + 1)/4.
In characteristics 2 and 3 the supersingular curves had another convenient feature: point doubling
on a supersingular curve in characteristic 2 and point tripling on a supersingular curve in character-
istic 3 take negligible time.
Convenient as these parameter choices were, the early writers on ECC later regretted having used
them, because in 1991 we learned that the discrete log problem on a supersingular curve is much
easier to solve than on most curves (see Section 4). Among all elliptic curves deﬁned over Fp the
supersingular ones are a tiny proportion — a randomly selected curve has probability only O (1/
√
p)
of being supersingular — but the frequent use of supersingular curves for ease of exposition gave
some people an exaggerated impression of their importance.
Avoiding supersingular curves does not, however, mean avoiding curves that are very easy to com-
pute with. For example, one can use the very same curve y2 = x3 − x but choose p ≡ 1 (mod 4). In
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p = a2 +b2 with a ≡ 1 (mod 4), then #E(Fp) = p+1−2a. (A similar example is given by y2 = x3 +1
with p ≡ 1 (mod 3).)
The two curves in the last paragraph are obtained by reduction mod p of an elliptic curve deﬁned
over Q that has complex multiplication by, respectively, the fourth roots and the third roots of unity.
Namely, on the curve y2 = x3 − x we have the automorphism (x, y) → (−x, iy), and on the curve
y2 = x3 + 1 we have (x, y) → (ζ x, y), where ζ = exp(2π i/3).
3.3. ECC protocols
By a protocol we mean a speciﬁc sequence of steps that are carried out in a particular application.
Most of the protocols using elliptic curves were obtained by simply repeating the ones that had been
developed for ﬁnite ﬁelds with the obvious modiﬁcation in notation. Until the advent of pairing-
based cryptography (see Section 9), there were no important protocols that exploited any of the rich
structure of elliptic curves.
However, it was a little tricky to ﬁnd a good elliptic curve analogue of the ﬁnite ﬁeld Digital Sig-
nature Algorithm that NSA developed in 1991 (see Section 7). We now describe this construction. In
the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) we suppose that Alice wants to sign a message
that she has sent to Bob, and both Alice and Bob are using the same elliptic curve deﬁned over Fq
containing a subgroup G of prime order n with generator P . For simplicity we shall suppose that q is
a prime, although the construction can easily be adapted to a prime power q as well.
As usual, we suppose that we have a “hash function” that assigns a value H to a message; H plays
the role of the message’s “ﬁngerprint” in the sense that we assume that it is computationally infeasi-
ble to ﬁnd two different messages with the same hash value.
ECDSA key generation. Each user Alice constructs her keys by selecting a random integer x in the
interval [1,n− 1] and computing Q = xP . Alice’s public key is Q ; her private key is x.
ECDSA signature generation. To sign a message having hash value H , 0 < H < n, Alice does the follow-
ing:
(1) She selects a random integer k in the interval [1,n− 1].
(2) She computes kP = (x1, y1) and sets r equal to the least non-negative residue of x1 mod n (where
x1 is regarded as an integer between 0 and q − 1). (Note: If r = 0, then she must go back to
step (1) and select another k.)
(3) She computes k−1 mod n and sets s equal to the least non-negative residue of k−1(H+ xr) mod n.
(Note: If s = 0, then she must go back to step (1).)
The signature for the message is the pair of integers (r, s).
ECDSA signature veriﬁcation. To verify Alice’s signature (r, s) on a message, Bob does the following:
(1) Obtain an authenticated copy of Alice’s public key Q .
(2) Verify that r and s are integers in the interval [1,n − 1], and compute the hash value H of the
message.
(3) Compute u1 = s−1H mod n and u2 = s−1r mod n.
(4) Compute u1P + u2Q = (x0, y0) and, regarding x0 as an integer between 0 and q − 1, set v equal
to the least non-negative residue of x0 mod n.
(5) Accept the signature if and only if v = r.
Notice that if Alice generated her signature correctly, then u1P + u2Q = (u1 + xu2)P = kP because
k ≡ s−1(H + xr) (mod n), and so v = r.
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At ﬁrst the only algorithms known to solve the elliptic curve discrete log problem were generic
ones, that is, they have nothing to do with the speciﬁc structure of the elliptic curve group. The ﬁrst
such algorithm, designed in the setting of ﬁnite ﬁeld discrete logs by Pohlig and Hellman [88], uses
the Chinese remainder theorem to reduce the problem to the discrete log problem in the prime order
subgroups. This is why groups of prime order are usually chosen for Diﬃe–Hellman type cryptosys-
tems.
In a group G of prime order n the two best generic algorithms — Shanks’ “baby-step/giant-step”
and Pollard’s rho [89] — each requires time roughly O (
√
n); for this reason they are known as
squareroot attacks on the discrete log problem. Although Shanks’ method has the advantage of be-
ing deterministic, it has a very large storage requirement — also of order
√
n — and so in practice
some randomized version of the Pollard-rho method is preferred.
The general idea of Pollard is to take a pseudo-random walk in G (i.e., it is deterministic, but
heuristically seems to have a high degree of randomness) using certain combinations of the base-
point P and the point Q with the unknown discrete log. As soon as the walk hits the same place
twice, one can immediately solve for the discrete log. The
√
n estimate comes from the “birthday
paradox.”
As we shall soon discuss, subsequently faster-than-squareroot algorithms were found for various
classes of elliptic curves. However, it still appears — after a quarter century of ECC — that the types of
curves used in most cryptographic applications cannot be attacked by anything faster than the generic
algorithms.
The last statement has to be qualiﬁed somewhat. One can group together a point and its negative
so as to apply Pollard-rho to a set of (n − 1)/2 pairs of points; this gives a speed-up of generic
Pollard-rho by a factor of
√
2. Moreover, if the curve E is deﬁned over a much smaller subﬁeld — say,
over Fq0 , where q = q0 — then by grouping together Frobenius conjugacy classes of points (obtained
by applying the map (x, y) → (xq0 , yq0)) one can speed up the generic algorithm by an additional
factor of
√
 (see [31,108]). This is a relatively small effect, but it does have to be taken into account
if one wants the eﬃciency advantage that comes from choosing an elliptic curve deﬁned over a small
ﬁeld.
4. The Weil pairing attack
If E is an elliptic curve deﬁned over Fq , q = p f , let E[n] ⊂ E(Fq), where Fq is the algebraic closure
of Fq , denote the set of all Fq-points of order n. If n is prime to p, then E[n] ≈ (Z/nZ) × (Z/nZ).
Let Fqk be the smallest ﬁeld that contains the coordinates of the points in E[n]. In our applications
n will be a prime dividing #E(Fq) but not dividing q − 1. In that case the integer k, which is called
the embedding degree, is also equal to the smallest positive integer such that n|(qk − 1). Let μn ⊂ F∗qk
denote the subgroup of nth roots of unity. Then the Weil pairing is a non-degenerate skew-symmetric
bilinear map
E[n] × E[n] → μn.
This pairing can be eﬃciently computed if k is not too big (see [81,82]).
The ﬁrst use of the Weil pairing in cryptography was to solve the discrete log problem in subex-
ponential time on an elliptic curve of low embedding degree. In [76] it was shown how the Weil
pairing could be used to transport the elliptic curve discrete log problem to the discrete log problem
in the group F∗
qk
. In the latter group index calculus methods are effective provided that k is very
small. (A similar attack using the Tate pairing was given by Frey and Rück [28], who introduced the
pairing into cryptographic use.)
However, curves for which k is small are very rare. The most important class of such curves are the
supersingular curves, i.e., those for which #E(Fq) ≡ 1 (mod p). For those curves k 6; in contrast, it
was shown in [4] that very few ordinary (meaning non-supersingular) curves have small embedding
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randomly chosen pair consisting of p and an ordinary curve over Fp has probability only O (p−1) of
having bounded embedding degree.
Nevertheless, the Weil pairing attack, which was the ﬁrst subexponential algorithm for the discrete
log problem on a prime order subgroup of points on any elliptic curve, had a major impact. As men-
tioned before, it had an especially chastening effect on those of us who for expository convenience
had used supersingular curves with embedding degree k = 2 in articles and books.
For almost a decade it was widely assumed that supersingular curves should be completely
avoided in cryptography, and that even an ordinary curve had to be checked to see that its embed-
ding degree was fairly large. In practice k  20 was usually considered to be suﬃcient to guarantee
intractability of the discrete log problem in F∗
qk
. However, some cryptographers have gone to the
extreme of insisting that k (q − 1)/100 (see Section 11).
In reality, as long as k  6, with the state-of-the-art techniques available at the time the discrete
log problem in the ﬁeld Fqk into which E(Fq) embeds was at least as hard to solve using index calcu-
lus as the discrete log problem was to solve directly on E(Fq) using Pollard-rho. And on rare occasions
curves with k = 6 were considered in cryptography papers (for example, [57]). But such curves were
almost universally shunned. Certainly no curves with low embedding degree were permitted in the
ECC standards.
5. Hyperelliptic curve cryptography
Just as the group of points on an elliptic curve can be used to construct cryptographic protocols,
so can the jacobian group of a genus-g hyperelliptic curve
y2 + h(x)y = x2g+1 + a1x2g + · · · + a2g+1
(with degh  g) deﬁned over Fq . This is a natural generalization of the elliptic curve group, which
is the case g = 1, and it was ﬁrst proposed for use in cryptography in 1989 [55]. The group order
for a hyperelliptic jacobian is approximately qg , that is, the same size as one gets in elliptic curve
cryptography working over the extension ﬁeld Fqg . In other words, if g is large, one can work over
a small ﬁeld. On the other hand, the group operation is much more cumbersome than in the elliptic
curve case: it uses a process of reduction of divisors that is closely analogous to Gauss’ method for
composition of binary quadratic forms. But in any case it turns out that the discrete log problem
is actually much easier on the jacobian of a high-genus curve than on a comparably sized group of
points of an elliptic curve, as shown by Adleman, DeMarrais, and Huang [1] in 1994.
5.1. Two meanings of “complexity”
The subexponential-time algorithm in [1] for the discrete log problem on the jacobian of a high-
genus curve came as a big surprise to people who were starting to think about implementing
hyperelliptic curve cryptography. When N. Koblitz proposed such systems in [55], he thought that
the diﬃculty of the discrete log problem for a genus g curve would probably be at least as great as
that of the corresponding problem on an elliptic curve. Isn’t it reasonable to assume that a problem
would be at least as hard to solve on a more complicated object (a g-dimensional jacobian) as on a
relatively simple object?
That way of thinking was a “rookie mistake” for a cryptographer to make, because he was con-
fusing two meanings of “complexity”: conceptual complexity and computational complexity. True,
standard treatments of algebraic curves often describe the genus g as a measure of the complexity of
the curve. And over a ﬁxed ﬁeld it is reasonable to regard high-genus curves as more complicated to
compute with than elliptic curves.
However, in practical applications what is ﬁxed is not the ﬁeld Fq , but rather the bitlength of the
group size qg . And the algorithm in [1], while not subexponential in logq, is subexponential in g logq
as g grows. Thus, from a computational standpoint the discrete log problem on a suitably chosen
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of a genus-163 hyperelliptic curve over F2. Such an elliptic curve at present would provide adequate
security for cryptographic applications, whereas the genus-163 curve deﬁnitely would not.
What made high-genus hyperelliptic curves computationally simpler than low-genus curves was
that there was a natural choice of “small” divisors that could be used in index calculus. Namely,
elements of the jacobian can be uniquely represented by certain pairs of polynomials of the form
(a(x),b(x)), where dega g and degb < dega. The elements represented by (a(x),b(x)) with a(x) of
small degree can be used as the “factor base” (see Section 3.1) for index calculus, and this was what
Adleman, DeMarrais, and Huang did.
5.2. Further developments in genus  3
A few years after the subexponential index calculus algorithm was found for high-genus jacobians,
Gaudry and others saw that for much smaller genus one could get similar algorithms that, while not
subexponential, were signiﬁcantly faster than Pollard-rho. The best and most recent of them [22] can
ﬁnd discrete logs in the jacobian group of a hyperelliptic curve over Fq of ﬁxed genus g in O (q2−2/g)
operations. Since a squareroot attack takes O (qg/2) operations, this is a big improvement for g  3; for
example, we get O (q4/3) rather than O (q3/2) for genus 3. Somewhat surprisingly, for non-hyperelliptic
curves of ﬁxed genus g , Diem [20] found an algorithm with signiﬁcantly faster running time than in
the hyperelliptic case, namely O (q2−2/(g−1)). However, for genus 2 thus far we have nothing faster
than Pollard-rho in the general case.
6. RSA vs. ECC
6.1. Early attitudes toward ECC
For several years after elliptic curve cryptography was proposed, the most common response
from cryptographers was curiosity and approval. Although most researchers had never studied el-
liptic curves and at ﬁrst had little understanding of the technical issues in ECC, they tended to react
positively to the general idea of a type of cryptography based on algebraic curves. In the late 1980s
a broad range of mathematicians were starting to work in the ﬁeld, and the growing interest in
cryptography by mathematicians and the increasing sophistication of the mathematics that was being
introduced perhaps were taken as an indication that public key cryptography was coming into its own
and would soon be “ready for prime time.”
Moreover, ECC was not perceived as a commercial threat to anyone. Commercial rivalries were still
in the future, and even RSA had not yet become a major force in commerce. In fact, to most people
in the 1980s the term “information security” meant that you bought a lock for your ﬁle cabinet. In
many ways the atmosphere during the ﬁrst decade of academic work on cryptography was relaxed,
open-minded and curious — a contrast with what came later.
6.2. ECC becomes a commercial threat
In the late 1980s three professors at the University of Waterloo formed a company, now called
Certicom, that developed and promoted ECC. Researchers aﬃliated with Certicom started attending
meetings of industrial standards bodies, where they lobbied for the inclusion of ECC protocols in the
recommendations. For example, the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (see Section 3.3) was
making headway as an eﬃcient alternative both to RSA signatures and to NSA’s original ﬁnite ﬁeld
Digital Signature Algorithm (see Section 7), although its ﬁnal approval and inclusion in the standards
did not occur until 1999 and 2000 [3,86].
Meanwhile, RSA Data Security was ﬁnally enjoying commercial success. RSA cryptography was
becoming well known among the general public, and it had a virtual monopoly on the market for
public key cryptography. On the other hand, there were clouds on the horizon. The recently developed
number ﬁeld sieve factoring method had lowered the running time for factoring a k-bit RSA modulus
from exp(k1/2+) to exp(k1/3+). This was a dramatic improvement, and it meant that the size of
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devices such as cell phones, pagers, and smart cards entered the mass market, promoters of ECC were
cautioning that RSA would have signiﬁcant disadvantages in “constrained environments” that had low
storage capacity and bandwidth.
6.3. “ECC Central”: RSA strikes back
In 1997 RSA Data Security put on its website a section called “ECC Central,” running to nine printed
pages, in order to respond to what they termed “signiﬁcant coverage in the media” and “the current
excitement around elliptic curve cryptosystems.” The website announced that
The recommendation of RSA, supported by the world’s top cryptographers and cryptanalysts, is
that the use of ECC puts customer data at far too great a risk and that further study and testing is
required.
The company’s main argument to justify its recommendation was that
. . . the integer factorization problem (on which the security of RSA depends) has been studied
intensively by number theorists and mathematicians around the world for literally hundreds of
years and there is no doubt that the RSA cryptosystem has stood the test of time very well. By
contrast, research into the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (on which the security of
elliptic curve cryptosystems depends) and on elliptic curve cryptosystems in general represents a
fraction of that spent on both RSA and the integer factorization.
The last section of the RSA policy statement rhetorically asked “Elliptic curve cryptosystems ready for
prime time?” and answered the question in the negative.
RSA buttressed its position by appending a section called “The Experts Comment on ECC” in which
eight cryptographers offered their skeptical commentary. Most interesting were the statements by
two of the three founders of RSA, Leonard Adleman and Ron Rivest. Adleman started by saying, “I am
suspicious of elliptic curve cryptosystems,” and then explained his suspicion by citing his work [1]
with DeMarrais and Huang giving a subexponential algorithm for the analogous problem for high-
genus hyperelliptic curves. He correctly pointed out that those curves had been thought to be at least
as secure as elliptic curves (see Section 5.1).
Rivest’s comments were the most erudite:
But the security of cryptosystems based on elliptic curves is not well understood, due in large
part to the abstruse nature of elliptic curves. Few cryptographers understand elliptic curves, so
there is not the same widespread understanding and consensus concerning the security of elliptic
curves that RSA enjoys. Over time, this may change, but for now trying to get an evaluation of the
security of an elliptic-curve cryptosystem is a bit like trying to get an evaluation of some recently
discovered Chaldean poetry.
Supporters of ECC countered these statements by pointing out that the claim that the security of
RSA rested on sturdier ground was a little misleading. Although Gauss himself spoke of his interest
in the integer factorization problem almost two hundred years ago, it is a gross exaggeration to say
that mathematicians have been studying the problem intensively since that time. In fact, it was the
invention of RSA cryptography in 1977 that stimulated stepped-up efforts to improve algorithms, and
most of the research on integer factorization is relatively recent.
In addition, the elliptic curve discrete log problem is analogous to the corresponding problem in a
ﬁnite ﬁeld, and most of the approaches to the elliptic curve problem are closely related to approaches
that were studied earlier in the ﬁnite ﬁeld context. The discrete log problem in a ﬁnite ﬁeld played
an important role in cryptography long before the invention of RSA and public key: in the 1950s it
arose in work on shift-register sequences. Index calculus was actually ﬁrst developed in the 1920s
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Moreover, it is not quite right that more sophisticated mathematical knowledge is needed to study
possible attacks on elliptic curves than to study approaches to the integer factorization problem. Al-
though it takes a little more mathematical background to understand the group law on an elliptic
curve than to understand the modular exponentiation in RSA, it is illogical to conclude from this that
research on breaking RSA through factoring is easier to understand than research on ﬁnding discrete
logs on elliptic curves. At the time that “ECC Central” appeared, by far the most complicated mathe-
matics that had ever been applied to solve either problem was the number ﬁeld sieve, which had had
such a dramatic impact on factoring. Contrary to what Rivest implied in the remark quoted above,
in 1997 the number of cryptographers with suﬃcient mathematical background to analyze and im-
prove upon the best attacks on integer factorization was less than the number who were capable of
evaluating the best attacks on the elliptic curve discrete log problem. As number theorists know well,
there is no correlation between ease of understanding the statement of a problem and the level of
diﬃculty involved in making progress in solving it.
6.4. Xedni calculus and liftings
In September 1998 J. Silverman circulated an outline of an attack [97] on the elliptic curve discrete
log problem. He called it “xedni” calculus (xedni = index spelled backwards) because in some sense
it reversed the steps in index calculus. Suppose we have two points P , Q in a prime order subgroup
G ⊂ E(Fp), and we want to ﬁnd x such that Q = xP . Silverman’s general idea was to start by ran-
domly generating a few (no more than 9) integer linear combinations Pi = ai P + bi Q and then lifting
them to points P˜ i with Z-coordinates. He then ﬁnds a lifting E˜ over Q that reduces to E mod p,
passes through the P˜ i , and satisﬁes some other conditions that, if one believes the heuristics of the
Birch and Swinnerton–Dyer conjecture (and uses an analytic formula of J.F. Mestre for the Mordell
rank of E˜), increase the likelihood that the points P˜ i ∈ E˜ will be dependent over Z. If they are depen-
dent, then it is easy to ﬁnd x.
Although the outline of xedni calculus was fairly simple, its running time would depend on some
subtle considerations that were hard to pin down in computational terms. At ﬁrst it was completely
unclear whether or not xedni calculus would be more eﬃcient than other algorithms for ﬁnding
elliptic curve discrete logs. This was still a time when RSA and ECC were in ﬁerce competition, and
the promoters of ECC feared that RSA people would seize upon the opportunity provided by xedni
calculus and proclaim to the world that ECC had been broken.
Fortunately, however, it turned out that slight modiﬁcations of Silverman’s algorithm could be
used to solve not only the discrete log problem in the multiplicative group of Fp (by applying it to
a degenerate elliptic curve, i.e., a rational curve over Fp), but also the problem of factoring an RSA
modulus N (by applying it to a degenerate elliptic curve over Z/NZ). In other words, if Silverman’s
algorithm destroyed ECC, then it would destroy RSA as well. This feature of the algorithm was very
opportune, because it gave us time to analyze it without having to worry about RSA people making
premature announcements about the threat from xedni calculus.
The xedni algorithm was found to be extremely ineﬃcient; in fact, it seemed to take super-
exponential time to ﬁnd discrete logs [46]. The reason was basically the same one that Miller [80]
had used back in 1985 to argue that index calculus would not work on elliptic curves. Namely, the
Néron–Tate height function guaranteed that E˜(Q) could not have a large number of “small” points.
Once again the height function played a crucial role in explaining why lifting techniques could not
be eﬃciently used to ﬁnd discrete logs. In 2000 N. Koblitz gave a talk on this at the ECC conference
in Essen titled “Miracles of the Height Function — A Golden Shield Protecting ECC.” Subsequent devel-
opments would show that Koblitz’s celebration of the “golden shield” was premature, as researchers
found faster-than-squareroot and even subexponential index calculus attacks on some elliptic curves
deﬁned over certain classes of ﬁnite ﬁelds (see Section 10). However, in none of these partial suc-
cesses of index calculus have liftings to global ﬁelds played any role.
At the ECC conference in 2007 Silverman [98] gave a much more systematic analysis of the failure
of four possible plans of attack on the discrete log problem based on lifting to a global ﬁeld. But de-
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will ever work. For this reason some people recommend staying away from elliptic curves over Fq for
which it is easy to construct a lifting to a number ﬁeld that has special properties that might some
day prove useful to an attacker. In particular, in Section 11 we will discuss the recommendation of the
Brainpool consortium that all curves used in ECC have complex multiplication by quadratic imaginary
ﬁelds of very high class number so that they cannot eﬃciently be lifted to a CM-curve over a number
ﬁeld.
7. The role of NSA
In the 1970s and early 1980s the U.S. National Security Agency was an extremely secretive orga-
nization. The standing joke at the time was that NSA stood for “No Such Agency.” People from NSA
would attend the crypto conferences that were starting to be held, but they would never identify
where they worked.
NSA was unhappy with the sudden growth of open research on cryptography that had been stim-
ulated by the invention of public key systems and especially RSA. In 1980 they made a heavy-handed
and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to impose a system of prior restraint on publication of mathe-
matical articles that they judged to have cryptographic relevance (see [69]).
But by the time the debates between RSA and ECC heated up in the 1990s, NSA had changed in
a fundamental way — it had “come in from the cold.” There were two main reasons for the transfor-
mation of NSA into an organization that started to participate openly in the cryptographic research
community.
The ﬁrst reason was a broadening of NSA’s mandate after the passage of the Computer Security
Act of 1987. Originally NSA had been given responsibility only for communication security for the
U.S. military and government agencies. But with the emergence of the Internet and other technologies,
communications were increasingly mixed up with computers, and it was becoming clear that issues of
computer security and communication security could not be separated. In addition, most government
communications were integrated with the public network and faced the same threats as everyone
else. So government security could not be kept separate from similar issues in the private sector.
Thus, in 1987 the U.S. government agency NIST (National Institute for Standards and Technology,
the new name of the National Bureau of Standards) was given a mandate to investigate and help
establish standards for security of all sorts of computer and communication networks. According to
some accounts [25,72] the intent of the Computer Security Act of 1987 in explicitly assigning this task
to NIST was to have non-military cryptography under civilian control and prevent NSA from venturing
into the private sector. However, in practice NSA has had the resources and expertise to dominate
NIST, and NIST has rarely played a signiﬁcant independent role. In any case, whatever the intent of
the Act was, in the aftermath NSA took on an increasing role in the civilian world.
The second basic reason for the emergence of a “kinder, friendlier NSA” (in the words of a top
NSA oﬃcial [109]) was the end of the Cold War. During the decade between the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the 9/11/2001 attacks, the U.S. did not have any obvious external enemy. As a result the
companies, government agencies, and even academic disciplines (such as Russian area studies) that
had come to prominence during the Cold War had to re-tool or else risk losing their relevance and
their funding. Thus, it was strongly in NSA’s interest to show that it had a role to play in developing
technology that could protect the commercial world and the public at large from all sorts of threats
to their communications.
Whatever the reasons for NSA’s new focus, the timing could not have been better for elliptic
curve cryptography, which by the mid-1990s was locked in an increasingly nasty competition with
RSA. From a commercial standpoint RSA had a tremendous advantage over the Canadian company
Certicom, which was the main promoter of ECC. RSA was well established, had name recognition
and had the lion’s share of the public key cryptography market. On the other hand, the advent of the
number ﬁeld sieve forced RSA to use longer and longer keys. People who understood the math behind
the two systems could see that over time RSA would be inferior to ECC in constrained environments
where memory and bandwidth are very limited.
A.H. Koblitz et al. / Journal of Number Theory 131 (2011) 781–814 793In the early 1990s there was a controversy over a proposed Digital Signature Standard that to
some extent presaged the role that NSA would later play in the debate over ECC. NIST proposed
a protocol for digital signatures that had been developed by NSA and closely resembled an earlier
method invented by C. Schnorr. In these systems the security of signatures was based on the discrete
log problem in a ﬁnite ﬁeld. This choice was a direct challenge to the predominance of factorization-
based cryptography, and it was bitterly opposed by RSA. Although the Digital Signature Standard —
which was approved for commercial use in 1994 — was not based on elliptic curves, it signaled a
dissatisfaction with RSA technology within NSA.
The technical people in NSA had been attracted to elliptic curve cryptography since the 1980s. But
the ﬁrst time these views became known to the outside world occurred at a meeting of the Amer-
ican National Standards Institute (ANSI) in December 1995. Meetings of standards bodies typically
include industry representatives who have little mathematical background and so are easily manipu-
lated by scare tactics. At the meeting in question, the RSA people were casting doubt on the safety of
ECC-based protocols. As the heated debate continued, one of the NSA representatives left to make a
phone call. He then returned to the meeting and announced that NSA believed that ECC had suﬃcient
security to be used for communications among all U.S. government agencies, including the Federal Re-
serve. People were stunned. Normally the NSA representatives at standards meetings would sit quietly
and hardly say a word. No one had expected such a direct and unambiguous statement from NSA —
a statement that tipped the scales at ANSI in favor of ECC.
At Crypto ’97 J. Solinas gave the ﬁrst paper ever presented publicly at a cryptography meeting
by an NSA member. It contained a procedure he had developed (see [103]) for greatly improved
eﬃciency of ECC using anomalous binary curves (see Section 11.1). NSA’s support for ECC became
more and more obvious over the years. In 2003 it licensed 26 ECC-related patents from Certicom
for US$25 million, and in 2005 it posted the paper “The Case for Elliptic Curve Cryptography” on its
website (see Section 1).
The inﬂuence of NSA, which is part of the U.S. Department of Defense, on the RSA versus ECC
debate is an example of a general phenomenon that has been documented by sociologists and histo-
rians of technology. For example, Braun and MacDonald (see [13] and [74, p. 16]) have shown that
military support played an essential role in the history of the microchip, especially in the early years
of semiconductor electronics when the commercial world viewed solid-state devices as inferior to the
earlier valve technology. According to MacKenzie and Wajcman [74, p. 15], “Military interest in new
technology has often been crucial in overcoming what might otherwise have been insuperable eco-
nomic barriers to its development and adoption.” In a sense, NSA served as a counterweight to RSA’s
market advantage, and in this way helped level the playing ﬁeld between RSA and ECC.
8. XTR vs. ECC
At Crypto 2000 A. Lenstra and Verheul [71] proposed a new type of cryptosystem called XTR. They
choose a prime p such that p2 − p + 1 has a large prime factor n, and they let G be the subgroup
μn ⊂ F∗p6 of order n in the multiplicative group of the degree-6 extension of Fp . They have a way
(which they call the “trace representation”) of writing elements of G as eﬃciently as if they lived
in the subﬁeld Fp2 (which, of course, they do not). But to ﬁnd discrete logs in G by index calculus
methods one would have to work in the ﬁeld of p6 elements, not p2 elements. Lenstra and Verheul
explained the advantages of their system:
XTR achieves security similar to RSA for much smaller key sizes than RSA. Although ECC key sizes
can be somewhat further reduced than XTR key sizes, in many circumstances. . . key sizes of ECC
and XTR will be comparable. . . XTR may be regarded as the best of two worlds, RSA and ECC.
They also claimed a security advantage over ECC:
However, XTR is not affected by the uncertainty still marring ECC security. . . . Also, compared to
ECC, the mathematics underlying XTR is straightforward, thus avoiding two common ECC-pitfalls:
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secure, and keeping abreast of. . . newly obtained results.
At the Crypto 2000 Rump Session, Menezes and Vanstone responded to the claims for XTR by
pointing out that the XTR group is precisely the group to which a certain supersingular curve E
deﬁned over Fp2 is isomorphic using the Weil pairing. Since the appearance of the Weil pairing
attack [76], such curves were generally avoided in ECC. Isn’t it risky to start using a group that is
so intimately related to a weak case of ECC? Of course, the Weil embedding transports the discrete
log problem on E to the XTR group, not vice-versa. This means that the problem on E reduces to
the problem on the XTR group, not that the two problems are equivalent. However, Menezes and
Vanstone asked whether there might be an eﬃciently computable map in the other direction that
inverted the map coming from the Weil pairing. If so, then that would show that the discrete log
problems on the two groups are exactly equivalent.
8.1. Verheul’s theorem
Lenstra and Verheul were bothered by the suggestion that their system was equivalent in security
to that of supersingular ECC. In 2000 supersingular elliptic curves were still viewed as too weak for
cryptography. Verheul took up the challenge of Menezes–Vanstone, and was able to prove a striking
theorem [105,106]: If an eﬃciently computable isomorphism existed from the XTR group to the curve,
then the Diﬃe–Hellman problem would be easy in both groups. Since that was unlikely, he concluded
that the map goes only one way.
Verheul’s own interpretation of his theorem — stated boldly in the title to [105,106] — was that
it provided evidence that XTR has strictly greater security (in the sense of hardness of the discrete
log problem) than the corresponding supersingular ECC. However, in the ﬁrst place, that conclusion
does not follow logically from the theorem. There is in fact no evidence that there is any method of
solving the discrete log problem on the supersingular curve that is faster than embedding it in the
XTR group and then solving the discrete log problem in that group. Just because a possible avenue
to proving equivalence of two problems — namely, constructing an eﬃcient isomorphism in both
directions — has been shown to be unlikely, that does not mean that in practice the problems are not
equivalent. For example, on curves of high embedding degree the so-called decision Diﬃe–Hellman
problem (the problem, given g, gx, g y , of determining whether or not a fourth group element is equal
to gxy) is believed to be solvable only if one can ﬁnd the discrete log of gx or g y . However, it is highly
unlikely that anyone will be able to prove by a reduction that the decision Diﬃe–Hellman problem is
equivalent to the discrete log problem in such a group.
If someone really believes, along with Verheul, that the supersingular curve E over Fp2 might
be even less secure than the subgroup of F∗
p6
into which it embeds, then presumably the same
would apply to all supersingular curves. That would have dire implications for much of pairing-based
cryptography. However, Verheul’s theorem was presented just a few months before the ﬁrst major
pairing-based protocols were announced. So at the time no one was worried about this implication
of Verheul’s claim in the title of his papers [105,106].
And what if a map in the reverse direction could be constructed? It turns out that Verheul’s
theorem can be generalized (see [30,84]) to all supersingular curves and all ﬁnite ﬁelds. Thus, the
construction of such a map would imply that the Diﬃe–Hellman problem is easy in all ﬁnite ﬁelds
and all supersingular elliptic curves. We do not mean to suggest that this is likely — we only want to
illustrate the point that Verheul’s theorem lends itself to multiple interpretations.
8.2. Skepticism’s last gasp
Despite the disparaging comments about ECC by the promoters of XTR, skepticism about elliptic
curves was very much on the decline by the start of the new millennium. Industrial standards bodies
had endorsed certain forms of ECC (see, e.g., [3,86]), and “ECC Central” had been removed from the
RSA website.
This is not to say that no one in recent years has expressed doubts about ECC. Occasionally a
writer on cryptography might object to the increasing acceptance of elliptic curve technology. For
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in 2005 took comments on the NSA paper “The Case for Elliptic Curve Cryptography” (see Section 1).
In response to a blogger who wrote, “But ECC was less researched than the others [sic] algorithms!”
Schneier posted the comment: “I agree with you, not the NSA.”
9. The dramatic entry of pairing-based cryptography
Starting in 2001, pairing-based cryptosystems were proposed by Dan Boneh, Matt Franklin, and
others. Although some of the ideas had been around for a couple of years (see, for example, [48,90]),
their tremendous potential had not been realized before.
The basic idea is that the Weil or Tate pairing on elliptic curves allows certain cryptographic func-
tions to be performed more eﬃciently than ever before, provided that one works with elliptic curves
where the pairing can be eﬃciently computed, i.e., curves of low embedding degree. Such curves
have the “Diﬃe–Hellman gap” property, which means that the Diﬃe–Hellman problem is thought to
be diﬃcult, whereas the decision Diﬃe–Hellman problem (see Section 8.1) can be easily solved using
the pairing.
One of the ﬁrst uses of pairing-based cryptography was the elegant solution by Boneh and
Franklin [10] to an old question of Shamir [94], who had asked whether an eﬃcient encryption
scheme could be devised in which a user’s public key would be just her identity (e.g., e-mail ad-
dress). Such a system is called identity-based encryption. Another early application (see below) was to
obtain short signatures.
9.1. Boneh–Lynn–Shacham signatures
We shall describe the pairing-based signature scheme of Boneh, Lynn and Shacham [11] in the
setting of the supersingular elliptic curve
y2 = x3 − x (1)
deﬁned over Fp , p ≡ 3 (mod 4). This curve E has group order p+1 and embedding degree 2; suppose
that p is chosen so that n = (p + 1)/4 is prime. Let P be a ﬁxed and publicly known generator of the
subgroup G ⊂ E(Fp) of prime order n. We deﬁne what is called a distortion map on the Fp2 -points
of E as follows:
Q = (u, v) → Q˜ = (−u, iv), where i2 = −1, i ∈ Fp2 .
This is the reduction mod p of the usual complex multiplication on the Q-curve with Eq. (1). It gives
an isomorphism from G ⊂ E(Fp) to a “distorted group” G˜ ⊂ E(Fp2 ) that, together with G , generates
all of E[n]. Note that non-degeneracy of the Weil pairing implies that the pairing of a non-trivial
element of G with a non-trivial element of G˜ gives a non-trivial nth root of unity.
Each user Alice chooses a random integer x mod n, which is her secret key, and computes the
point Q = xP , which is her public key. Suppose that Alice wants to sign a message to Bob that has
hash value H , which we suppose is an Fp-point of E . All she does is compute S = xH , which is her
signature for the message. When Bob receives the message and the signature he computes the hash
value H and then the two pairing values
(H, Q˜ ) and (S, P˜ ).
If Alice created the signature correctly, then the two values must be equal, because they are both
equal to
(H, P˜ )x.
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able to generate the point S whose discrete log to the base H is the same as the discrete log of Q to
the base P .
Not only is the Boneh–Lynn–Shacham signature shorter in bitlength (if implemented with a
suitably-chosen elliptic curve) and easier to describe than the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algo-
rithm (see Section 3.3), but, unlike ECDSA, it uses properties of elliptic curves in an essential way and
does not have any analogue in the simpler group F∗q .
9.2. Selection of curves
There are two ways to select a curve of low embedding degree k. One can choose a supersingular
curve, for which k 6. Supersingular curves have the advantage that there is a computable distortion
map that can be used to construct protocols (see Section 9.1).
However, one often wants k  6 to be large enough so that the time required to ﬁnd discrete
logs using index calculus in Fqk is comparable to the time required to ﬁnd discrete logs directly in
the group G using a squareroot attack. At present k = 6 is a reasonable choice, but with increased
computing power the optimal choice of k will soon be larger. A supersingular curve with k = 6 exists
only in characteristic 3, and there is no supersingular curve with k > 6. Thus, implementers might
want to use ordinary curves of low embedding degree. Such curves are rare, and the only way known
to construct them is to use the so-called CM-method.
Let E be an ordinary elliptic curve deﬁned over Fp with trace t , which means that #E(Fp) =
p + 1 − t . We want p + 1 − t to be a prime (or a prime times a very small cofactor); we want
pk ≡ 1 (mod p+ 1− t) (note that this is equivalent to (t − 1)k ≡ 1 (mod p+ 1− t)); and we want the
discriminant t2 − 4p to have small squarefree part d, in which case a curve over a number ﬁeld can
be found with complex multiplication by Q(
√
d) that reduces modulo a prime lying over p to a curve
with the desired properties. The idea of the construction of ordinary curves with low k by the CM-
method is to ﬁnd a family of integers (p, t) parameterized by an integer z such that the second and
third of these conditions hold (and there is a reasonable probability that p is prime and p+ 1− t has
a large prime factor). The ﬁrst results of this type were found for k = 3,4,6 in [83]; in the case k = 6
they set p = 4z2 + 1 and t = 1 ± 2z. Subsequently other authors showed how to construct ordinary
curves for certain embedding degrees k > 6.
9.3. Like a knife through butter
Pairing-based cryptography received near-universal acceptance and acclaim from the beginning.
Unlike traditional ECC, it did not pass through a period of several years of skepticism and resistance.
We ﬁnd this especially striking because the curves used in this type of cryptography are precisely the
ones that were shunned in ECC for many years after the discovery of the Weil pairing attack [76] and
were still being disparaged as late as Eurocrypt 2001 by Verheul [105].
This paradoxical turn of events has several possible explanations. In the ﬁrst place, it is hard not to
be attracted by the sheer elegance of some of the constructions in pairing-based cryptography. Note,
for example, how much simpler the Boneh–Lynn–Shacham signature is to describe (see Section 9.1)
than the ECDSA was (see Section 3.3).
In the second place, the timing was propitious. The ﬁrst major pairing-based protocols were being
promoted in the years right after traditional ECC had won acceptance and the once-bitter rivalry
between RSA and ECC had subsided. Basically, most of the earlier critics of ECC had thrown in the
towel — starting in the late 1990s the RSA software toolkit even included a version of ECC.
In the history of technology it often happens that after a period of intense debate (what the
sociologists Kline and Pinch [50] call interpretative ﬂexibility) a consensus emerges to admit the “new
kid on the block” into full membership in the club. At that point most people see no beneﬁt in
standing in the way of adopting the newer technology; rather, it seems to be in everyone’s interest to
incorporate it into their theories and products. This process is known as closure. As Kline and Pinch
explain,
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that some artifacts [i.e., inventions] appear to have fewer problems and become increasingly the
dominant form of the technology. This, it should be noted, may not result in all rivals vanishing,
and often two very different technologies can exist side by side (for example, jet planes and pro-
peller planes). Also this process of closure and stabilization need not be ﬁnal. New problems can
emerge and interpretative ﬂexibility may reappear [50, pp. 113–114].
A third explanation for the immediate acceptance of pairing-based cryptography is that by 2001
the viewpoint that papers proposing new protocols must always include a “proof of security” had
become pervasive, especially on cryptography conference program committees. Almost all papers
proposing pairing-based protocols included such “proofs,” and they served to reassure people about
the security of the systems.
This is not the place to repeat the critique of “provable security” in the series of papers [60,59,61].
Suﬃce it to say that the guarantees given by such proofs, even when the proofs are mathematically
correct, are very conditional and contingent. In recent years what has often happened is that, whether
or not readers fully understand the proof, they are mesmerized by it and are willing to put aside any
doubts they might have had. Most likely this effect was at work in causing virtually universal and
unquestioning acceptance of pairing-based cryptography in the research community.
What a “security proof” — or, as we prefer to say, a reductionist security argument [60] — actually
does show is that an adversary cannot succeed in mounting a certain category of attack unless a
certain underlying mathematical problem is tractable. What is peculiar in the case of pairing-based
cryptography is that the underlying mathematical problem is often a very contrived one, of the sort
that hardly any mathematician would recognize as natural, let alone want to study. Nevertheless, it
has become customary to regard a conditional result related to such a problem as a type of guarantee
of security.
For example, the underlying problem in [8] is called the m-strong Diﬃe–Hellman problem in a
group G of prime order n. Let g be a generator of G , and let x denote an unknown integer mod n.
Given the m+ 1 group elements g, gx, gx2 , . . . , gxm , the m-strong Diﬃe–Hellman problem asks one to
ﬁnd a pair (c,h) (where c is a non-zero integer mod n and h is a group element) such that hx+c = g .
At ﬁrst it seemed that in practice this problem would prove to be as hard as ﬁnding discrete logs —
in other words, in a generic group G no algorithm would be faster than
√
n. However, at Eurocrypt
2006 Cheon [17], using the same method that had been described earlier in a different context by
Brown and Gallant [16], showed that if n − 1 has a factor m0 m of size a little less than n1/3, then
the m-strong problem can be solved in roughly n1/3 operations. So the underlying problem used in
the security proof turned out to be weaker than expected.
Some of the other underlying problems that occur in reductionist security arguments for pairing-
based systems are even more ornate and contrived than the m-strong Diﬃe–Hellman problem
(see [62] for some examples). Nevertheless, few people have expressed skepticism regarding the true
security of the “provably secure” pairing-based protocols.
We wish to stress that we have no reason to believe that any pairing-based protocol is actually
insecure. Our purpose in discussing this issue is not to urge people to avoid such cryptosystems, but
rather to raise the intriguing question of why there have been hardly any skeptics in the research
community.
A ﬁnal reason for the rapid acceptance of pairing-based cryptography is that it was not perceived
as a threat either to important commercial interests or to established traditions of cryptographic
research. On the contrary, the idea had an immediate appeal both for practical reasons — it provided
the opportunity to improve functionality — and for intellectual reasons as well — it used some clever
ideas in both mathematics and protocol design.
Moreover, the timing could not have been better for the cryptography profession, which was hav-
ing some diﬃculty coming up with a lot of nice problems for research projects. A large number of
people with math or computer science backgrounds had entered the ﬁeld and were faced with the
challenge — especially, but not exclusively, in academia — to “publish or perish.” In addition, there
had been a proliferation of cryptography conferences, all of which hoped to attract cutting-edge re-
search papers. An increasing concern of program committees was that it was unrealistic to expect the
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Against this backdrop the entrance onto the stage of pairing-based cryptography was like a godsend.
As mentioned before, pairing-based cryptography started at the height of inﬂuence of the notion
of “provable security,” and almost all papers in the area included reductionist arguments for the
security of the proposed protocol. Interestingly, this tradition of always including a security proof led
to even more possibilities for research projects, thanks to the controversy surrounding the so-called
“random oracle model.” (The random oracle model basically allows one to make arguments for the
security of a protocol under the plausible assumption that hash function values are indistinguishable
from random bitstrings.) Leading theoreticians — apparently inspired in part by the Biblical story of
the Bronze Serpent (see [35, pp. 10–11]) — had decided that the random oracle assumption that is
used in many security proofs is suspect, and cryptographers should try to design protocols that have
security proofs that avoid the use of this assumption. As a result it became common ﬁrst to develop
a protocol with nice properties that has a proof of security in the random oracle model, and then to
publish a modiﬁed version, usually with slightly less desirable properties but with a security proof
in a “standard” model. This was an important advance for the profession, since in one fell swoop it
increased the number of papers that could be published on provably secure protocols from N to 2N .
10. A chink in the golden shield: Index calculus again rears its head
10.1. Weil descent
In the late 1990s Gerhard Frey had the idea of attacking the discrete log problem on an elliptic
curve deﬁned over Fqm by transporting it to the jacobian group of a curve over the smaller ﬁeld Fq ,
where it could be solved using index calculus in a way similar to [1]. This program was ﬁrst carried
out in certain cases by Gaudry, Hess, and Smart [33], and their method has been generalized by
Hess [40].
In some very special situations it has been possible to transport the discrete log problem on the
elliptic curve deﬁned over Fqm to the corresponding problem on the jacobian group of a genus-m
curve deﬁned over Fq (in that case both groups have the same order ≈ qm). In other special cases
the genus of the curve is considerably larger than m, but the resulting algorithm is still faster-than-
squareroot as a function of qm .
Weil descent does not apply over prime ﬁelds, and in the range of interest in cryptography it
seems not to apply to curves considered over prime degree extensions of F2 (see [77]). Its main
successes so far have been for curves deﬁned over the ﬁelds F2 f when f is divisible by 3, 5, 6, 7,
or 8. For example, in [79] one of the classes of curves to which the Weil descent methods in [33]
were shown to be applicable is the set of all elliptic curves E deﬁned over F25 (with  prime) and
not over a proper subﬁeld. In theory it might be possible to transport the discrete log problem on E
to the jacobian of a genus-5 curve over F2 , for which there would be an index calculus algorithm
requiring O (21.6) operations. In practice, though, the curves that came out of the Weil descent had
genus 15 or 16, resulting in an algorithm with running time roughly 22 . This was still signiﬁcantly
better than Pollard-rho, which takes time 22.5+ .
10.2. Other potentially weak ﬁelds for ECC
In [32] Gaudry used index calculus methods directly on elliptic curves deﬁned over Fqm with
m > 1. For a factor base he used the set of points whose x-coordinate lies in Fq . He performed the
crucial step of expressing a randomly generated point in terms of the factor base by means of sum-
mation polynomials, a concept introduced by Semaev [93]. For ﬁxed m the running time of Gaudry’s
algorithm was O (q2−2/m), so for m 3 this gave a faster-than-squareroot attack.
In addition, Diem [21] proved that Gaudry’s algorithm yields a subexponential algorithm when the
size of the ﬁeld Fqm increases in such a way that m2 is of order logq.
Fortunately for ECC, by the late 1990s implementers had largely restricted themselves to either
prime ﬁelds or prime degree extensions of F2. Prime ﬁelds and binary ﬁelds have traditionally been
the easiest ﬁnite ﬁelds to use in most applications. The choice of prime degree m of F2m was partly
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taken over such an extension if one wants the group order to be divisible by a prime of roughly m
bits. Thus, when NIST decided to recommend one random curve and one anomalous binary curve for
each recommended binary ﬁeld, it was natural to choose m to be prime values for which the order
of one of the curves (2) or (3) (see below) is equal to twice a prime or four times a prime [86]. In
any case, because of this preference for prime ﬁelds and prime degree binary ﬁelds, the faster-than-
squareroot attacks described in this section, none of which applied to curves over such ﬁelds, had no
impact on real-world implementations.
11. A tale of two standards: Brainpool vs. Voltage
In this section we compare two recent recommendations concerning which elliptic curves to use
in ECC. One comes from Brainpool, a European consortium of companies and government agencies
led by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI, the German equivalent of NSA).
The other one [12] comes from an American company called Voltage, which presented it at a NIST
workshop on pairing-based protocols (see [75]). What is interesting to us is the extent to which these
recommendations contradict one another.
The Brainpool draft [73] explicitly excludes all elliptic curves of low embedding degree (hence all
supersingular curves) and all ordinary elliptic curves whose CM-ﬁeld has low class number (hence all
curves constructed by the CM-method). In particular, Brainpool rules out all curves (supersingular or
ordinary) used in pairing-based cryptography.
Both of these Brainpool requirements are given in a rather extreme form. The embedding degree
must be greater than (q − 1)/100. If, for example, q has 160 bits (the smallest size they allow), then
they are saying that it is a bad idea to use an elliptic curve group that embeds in a ﬁnite ﬁeld of the
form Fqk with k a 150-bit integer (i.e., k ≈ (q − 1)/1000). Note that in such a humongous ﬁeld the
fastest algorithms known for the ﬁnite ﬁeld discrete log would take time greater than exp(1015) —
roughly 1 followed by four hundred trillion zeros. Brainpool certainly seems to want to err on the
side of caution! They also require that when the elliptic curve lifts to an elliptic curve over a number
ﬁeld that has complex multiplication, that number ﬁeld must have degree greater than ten million.
In contrast, the Voltage recommendation [75] states under “security considerations” that
The conservative choice for implementing a pairing-based algorithm is to use a supersingular
curve.
The elliptic curve they recommend using is the curve
y2 = x3 + b
over a prime ﬁeld Fp with p ≡ −1 (mod 12). This curve has p + 1 points, embedding degree 2, and
complex multiplication by the ring Z[ζ ], ζ = exp(2π i/3).
Moreover, the Voltage curve has far more structure than most curves because it is supersingular.
Namely, supersingular curves have a gigantic endomorphism ring — a quaternion algebra that includes
imaginary quadratic rings as a small part. For the Voltage curve E the endomorphism ring of E(Fp)
is the following quaternion algebra:
Z + Zζ + Zφ + Zφζ,
where φ is the Frobenius endomorphism (x, y) → (xp, yp), which satisﬁes the relation φ2 = −p. Since
ζ p = ζ−1, the commutation relation here is: ζφ = φζ−1 = −φ − φζ .
No one has ever been able to use this vast stable of endomorphisms to mount an attack on the
discrete log problem on a supersingular curve. So there is no real evidence that the Voltage curve is
weak. But its extensive special properties would certainly give heartburn to the Brainpool cryptogra-
phers.
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pairing-based cryptography, if you want to use an ordinary curve rather than a supersingular curve,
you must use a very special version of the CM-method to construct your curve (see Section 9.2).
As explained in [75]: “With ordinary curves, additional structure is needed to get a low embedding
degree.” As mentioned in [58], the type of special values of p that are used might cause the discrete
log problem in Fpk (where k is the embedding degree) to be vulnerable to a version of the special
number ﬁeld sieve rather than the general number ﬁeld sieve. Indeed, Schirokauer [91] has shown
that this is true in a few cases. However, in most cases it is far from clear that the “additional
structure” in the choice of the prime p or the group order n could ever be utilized by an attacker.
So whether the “conservative choice” is to use supersingular curves or to generate ordinary curves
of low embedding degree — or perhaps (if one is a follower of Brainpool) to avoid pairing-based
cryptography altogether — is anyone’s guess.
11.1. Special or random selection of parameters?
A general philosophy one often encounters in cryptography is that whenever possible parameters
should be chosen by some random process. If a special choice is made to increase eﬃciency, there is
always the risk that the same property that made the choice so attractive will also lead to vulnera-
bility to an unanticipated attack.
In the case of elliptic curve cryptography one of the arguments for its superiority over RSA was
the tremendous variety of curves to choose from. This means that there are several opportunities to
introduce randomness into parameter selection. One can make a random choice of prime ﬁeld Fp , for
instance, followed by random choices of the coeﬃcients in the Weierstrass equation of the curve. This
is, in fact, essentially what Brainpool recommends.
In 1985 R. Schoof [92] devised the ﬁrst polynomial-time algorithm to determine the group order
for an arbitrary elliptic curve. His method was greatly improved upon by Atkin, Morain, Elkies, and
others. Much of this work was based on isogenies of elliptic curves; this was the ﬁrst — but not the
last (see Section 11.2) — cryptographic application of isogenies.
The availability of eﬃcient point-counting algorithms for random elliptic curves means that there
is no practical reason not to use them. On the other hand, certain special curves have signiﬁcant
eﬃciency advantages. For example, over characteristic-2 ﬁelds one can save a lot of time computing
point multiples by using the so-called anomalous binary curves deﬁned over F2
y2 + xy = x3 + x2 + 1 (2)
and
y2 + xy = x3 + 1 (3)
(see [56,103]). In elliptic curve cryptography one would use a prime order subgroup of the group of
points deﬁned over an extension of F2.
The conventional wisdom is that there is a trade-off. If you want long-term security, you must be
willing to sacriﬁce a little bit of eﬃciency and generate your parameters in a random way. On the
other hand, if a special choice of parameters allows for greater eﬃciency and if there are no known
attacks that utilize their special properties, and if you are willing to risk the possibility that such
attacks will be found some day, then by all means use, for example, anomalous binary curves.
This point of view seems logical, and it is uncontroversial among cryptographers. However, under
certain circumstances it may be wrong. In particular, it is conceivable that Brainpool’s super-cautious
recommendations might cause one to choose curves that are less secure than some CM-type curves
might be. In other words, random curves might be riskier than special curves.
Before explaining how this is possible, we would like to make a remark about the notion of special
versus generic curves. As we saw in Section 5.1, a word such as “complexity” might have a different
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complexity are two quite different things. The same goes for the term “special curve.”
Example 1. In the study of algebraic curves one normally regards hyperelliptic curves as a very special
subclass. For g  3 there are far fewer hyperelliptic than non-hyperelliptic curves in the sense that
the hyperelliptic curves correspond to a submanifold of codimension g − 2 in the moduli space of
all genus-g curves. That is, for g  3 there are roughly 1/qg−2 times as many hyperelliptic curves as
non-hyperelliptic curves over Fq .
Yet Diem and Thomé [23] found an index calculus attack on the discrete log problem in the ja-
cobian group of a genus-3 non-hyperelliptic curve over Fq that has running time of order only q1+ .
In [20] Diem generalized this algorithm to all “suﬃciently general” non-hyperelliptic curves of ar-
bitrary genus g  3 with running time q2−2/(g−1)+ . This algorithm is substantially faster than the
fastest known algorithm for discrete logs in the jacobian group of a hyperelliptic curve (see [22]),
which takes time q2−(2/g)+ . To put it another way, over a ﬁxed ﬁeld Fq the discrete log problem on
the jacobian of a genus-g hyperelliptic curve has the same computational complexity (in the sense of
the best available algorithms) as the discrete log problem on the (much larger) jacobian of a genus-
(g + 1) non-hyperelliptic curve. It turned out that a certain way in which a generic non-hyperelliptic
curve can be represented as a plane curve allows for a particularly eﬃcient generation of relations
among divisor classes. Thus, to the best of our current knowledge, it is the non-hyperelliptic curves
and not the hyperelliptic curves whose discrete log problems have a special vulnerability to index
calculus.4
There are various scenarios in which someone (say, Alice) who chose to use ECC with a special
curve might end up better off than someone else (say, Bob) who chose a random curve. Our ﬁrst ex-
ample is a little removed from practice because we use extension ﬁelds of composite degree, whereas
real-world implementations of ECC generally are over either a prime ﬁeld Fp or an extension of F2
of prime degree.
Example 2. Suppose that Alice wants to use an anomalous F2-curve (2) or (3) over a ﬁeld extension
of degree 5 with  prime. She knows, of course, that, because of the large subgroup of order ≈ 2
consisting of the F2 -points of the curve, the largest prime order subgroup she can hope to get has
order roughly 24 . (It will actually be a little smaller because there is also a subgroup of F25 -points.)
This means that the Pollard-rho algorithm will take time approximately 22 . (There will also be a
slight speed-up from grouping together conjugate points as explained in [31,108], but this is only
by
√
, and we are using rough asymptotic running times here.) So if Alice wants k bits of security
she will have to use  of order k/2. Nevertheless, she still wants to use an anomalous curve because
she feels that its eﬃciency advantage is great enough to compensate for the need to choose  a little
larger.
Meanwhile, Bob thinks that Alice is being unwise, because if he uses a random curve over the
same type of ﬁeld F25 with  prime, he can ﬁnd a curve whose group order is twice a prime, in
which case Pollard-rho will take time roughly 22.5 . That means that he can get the same k bits of
security as Alice with  equal only to 0.4k.
Bob’s reasoning made perfect sense throughout the 1990s. However, the study of Weil descent
in [79] showed that the discrete log problem on a random curve over F25 can be reduced to the
corresponding problem in the jacobian of a genus-15 or genus-16 curve over F2 , which, in turn, can
be solved in time roughly 22 . This is asymptotically the same as the time for Pollard-rho on Alice’s
special curve. Thus, Bob took a bad gamble when he decided to use a random curve with a lower
value of  than Alice’s. He gets only 0.8k bits of security, not the k bits he thought he would get.
4 An algorithm of Smith [100] allows one sometimes to transport the discrete logarithm problem on the jacobian of a genus-3
hyperelliptic curve to a non-hyperelliptic jacobian. For large Fq the procedure works for approximately 18% of all hyperelliptic
curves. Smith’s algorithm applies only to curves of genus 3 and ﬁelds of characteristic > 3.
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have to talk about isogenies.
11.2. Isogenies and endomorphism rings
We shall give a brief overview of isogenies between elliptic curves. For proofs and details see [96,
107]. Let E1 and E2 be deﬁned over Fq . An isogeny ψ : E1 → E2 deﬁned over Fq is a non-constant
rational map deﬁned over Fq that maps ∞ to ∞; its degree is its degree as a rational map. If ψ is a
separable isogeny, then the kernel of ψ is a subgroup of E1 of order degψ .
Any isogeny ψ : E1 → E2 has a dual isogeny ψ̂ : E2 → E1 such that the composition ψ ◦ ψ̂ is the
endomorphism of multiplication by degψ . We say that E1 and E2 are isogenous over Fq if there exists
an isogeny from one to the other that is deﬁned over Fq . A theorem of Tate states that E1 and E2 are
isogenous over Fq if and only if #E1(Fq) = #E2(Fq).
For example, suppose that  is a prime not equal to the characteristic of the ﬁeld, and C is a
subgroup of E1 of order  that is deﬁned over Fq . (Recall that this means that the subgroup C is ﬁxed
by the Frobenius map φ : (x, y) → (xq, yq), which can be true even if the individual points of C are
not in Fq .) For every such group C there is a degree- isogeny from E1 to a curve E2 deﬁned over Fq
whose kernel is C .
The modular polynomial Φ[X, Y ] ∈ Z[X, Y ] has the property that if we let Φ denote the reduction
mod p and set Y equal to the j-invariant of E1, then the  + 1 roots of Φ[X, j] ∈ Fq[X] are the j-
invariants of all of the curves E2 that are -isogenous to E1 over the algebraic closure Fq . Each such
isogeny corresponds to one of the  + 1 subgroups of order  in the group of 2 points of order 
on E1(Fq). An -isogeny from a given curve can be quickly constructed if  is small; however, in
general the best available algorithm [65] has running time roughly 3, so for large  the construction
is not feasible.5
Let E be an elliptic curve deﬁned over Fq , q = p f , and let t = q + 1− #E(Fq) denote its trace. An
endomorphism of E is an isogeny from E to itself that is deﬁned over Fq . The endomorphisms form
a ring denoted End(E). We consider the ordinary case when p does not divide t; in that case the
elements of End(E) are all deﬁned over Fq . Let  = t2 − 4q denote the discriminant of E . Then the
complex multiplication (CM) ﬁeld of E is K = Q(√). We have  = c20d, where d < 0 is the discrimi-
nant of the imaginary quadratic number ﬁeld K . Let ZK denote the ring of integers; then End(E) ⊂ ZK
is an order in ZK . We let c denote the conductor of End(E), i.e., its index in ZK .
As before, let φ denote the Frobenius endomorphism, given by (x, y) → (xq, yq). We regard φ as
an element of ZK of norm q, since its characteristic polynomial is T 2 − tT + q = 0. The subring Z[φ]
has index c0 =
√
/d in ZK , and End(E) is an order of ZK that contains Z[φ], and so its index in ZK
is a divisor c of c0, 1 c  c0.
The curves in the Fq-isogeny class of a given E can be partitioned according to their endomor-
phism ring, i.e., into “endomorphism classes” within the isogeny class. The endomorphism rings are
the orders in ZK that contain Z[φ], and they are in one-to-one correspondence with the divisors c
of c0. The number of isomorphism classes of curves in a given endomorphism class is equal to the
class number hc of the order, and this is approximately equal to chK , where hK is the class num-
ber of the imaginary quadratic CM ﬁeld K (for a more precise formula, see [29, p. 123]). The class
number hK satisﬁes hK  1π
√|d| log |d|, where d is the discriminant of K .
As mentioned before, the ﬁrst use of isogenies was to develop improved methods of determining
the group order of a random curve. More recently, isogenies have been used to investigate possible
attacks on the elliptic curve discrete log problem. The idea is that if an isogeny can be computed
between E1 and E2, then the discrete log problem on E1 can be transported to the same problem
on E2. If it is feasible to construct isogenies between any two curves in a certain subset of the isogeny
class, then the discrete log problem is random self-reducible in that subset of curves; this implies that
the problem is equally diﬃcult for all of those elliptic curves.
5 In certain special cases there are faster methods [15], but they work only within a single L-conductor-gap class (this term
is deﬁned below) and so do not affect our argument.
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chooses an -isogeny E1 → E2, where  is a small prime. Then either E2 is in the same endomorphism
class as E1, or else it has conductor c or else c/. The last two possibilities can occur only if |c0. The
main result of [47] (assuming the Generalized Riemann Hypothesis) is that a sequence of isogenies of
prime degree  < L = (logq)2+ (for ﬁxed ), (, c0) = 1, can be used to fan out randomly throughout
the endomorphism class. (The precise statement is that the graph whose vertices are the isomorphism
classes in a given endomorphism class with adjacency determined by these -isogenies is an expander
graph.)
It is also possible to use isogenies to go eﬃciently between two endomorphism classes, but only
if they have a small conductor gap, by which we mean the largest prime that divides one conductor
and not the other. Thus, if L is a bound on the size of primes  for which it is feasible to construct an
-isogeny, it is natural to divide a given isogeny class into subsets that each consist of endomorphism
classes with conductor gap < L. Thus, in each isogeny class we deﬁne the L-conductor-gap class of a
curve E to be the set of all endomorphism classes having conductor gap < L with End(E). The result
of [47] extends to these larger classes; that is, the discrete log problem is random self-reducible in
each L-conductor-gap class. That means that if an eﬃcient algorithm were found to solve the discrete
log problem in time T1 in a constant proportion  of all elliptic curves deﬁned over Fq (we shall
call them “weak” curves), then the discrete log could be found on any curve in the L-conductor-gap
class in time roughly T1 + T2/ , where T2 is the time required to construct an -isogeny,  < L. Here,
of course, we are assuming that the property of being a weak curve for the discrete log algorithm is
independent of isogeny class and endomorphism ring; and we are also assuming that the L-conductor-
gap class contains  1/ curves.
Note that if c0 = 1 (which is often the case) or if c0 is L-smooth, then all O (√q) curves in the
isogeny class are in the same L-conductor-gap class. If c0 is divisible by just a single large prime r,
then there are two such classes: a small set of isomorphism classes of curves whose endomorphism
ring has conductor not divisible by r, and the “generic” isomorphism classes where the endomorphism
ring has conductor a multiple of r.
It is the possibility of random isogeny walks through a conductor-gap class that under certain
circumstances might make a generic curve less secure than a special curve. We discuss this in the
next subsection.
11.3. More examples of potential weakness of random curves
Example 3. In V. Müller’s Table 6.2 of [85] the following is a choice of parameters suggested for ECC.
Let q = 23·59, and let E be the curve deﬁned over F8 by the equation
y2 + xy = x3 + x2 + γ ,
where γ ∈ F8 satisﬁes γ 3 = γ 2 + 1. This curve has 6 F8-points, and its group of F2177 -points has
order 6 times the 175-bit prime
P175 = 31926990434706017882465563211521159723534715689440269.
Suppose that Alice, following the suggestion of Müller, chooses this curve E and extension
ﬁeld F2177 . She calculates that Pollard-rho (with the speed-up of
√
59 in [31,108]) would take roughly
284 operations, i.e., the curve will give her 84 bits of security.
Bob, as usual, thinks that Alice is foolish for having chosen a curve with very special properties
that allow the
√
59 speed-up and may leave her vulnerable to other attacks. He ﬁgures that if he
chooses a random curve over the same ﬁeld with group order twice a 176-bit prime, then he will
get 88 bits of security rather than 84, and he will also be less vulnerable to unanticipated specialized
attacks.
At least through the 1990s Bob’s reasoning would have appeared to be correct. But a closer exam-
ination using more recent research (see [79,78]) shows that Bob might not have nearly the security
level that he thinks he has.
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√−23), and the discriminant is −23c20 with
c0 factoring as the product of two primes:
c0 = 11681 · 98766024850235972863.
In [78] Menezes and Teske found that a certain proportion — roughly  = 2−58 — of all elliptic curves
over F23·59 with group order ≡ 2 (mod 8) are “weak” in the sense that Weil descent can be used
to transport the discrete log problem to the corresponding problem on the jacobian of a genus-3
hyperelliptic curve over F259 . At that point the discrete log problem can be solved in time roughly
259·4/3 ≈ 279 [22].
In what follows we shall make the (plausible) assumption that the property of being a “weak”
curve is independent of isogeny and endomorphism classes — in other words, that the expected
number of weak curves in such a class is roughly equal to  = 2−58 times its cardinality.
In Bob’s case almost certainly the discriminant of his curve E is not divisible by the square of a
large prime, and so it is possible to use isogenies to transport the discrete log problem on E along
a “random walk” throughout its isogeny class. If his group order is ≡ 2 (mod 8) (of which there
is a 50% chance), then after approximately 258 isogenies we will have transported the discrete log
problem to a curve where it can be solved in time roughly 279. Each step in the “walk” takes time
approximately 217, so that the reduction to the weak curve will take time ≈ 275. In other words, Bob’s
random curve will have just 79 bits of security, not 88 bits as Bob thought and not even the 84 bits
that Alice has.
In contrast, even if the result in [78] applied to curves in Alice’s isogeny class (which it does not,
since the number of points on her curve is ≡ 6 (mod 8)), she would still be safe because her curve’s
endomorphism ring has conductor 1 and is in a 266-conductor-gap class containing fewer than 216
curves (the ones with conductor 1 or 11681). Under our assumption that the “weak” property is inde-
pendent of isogeny or endomorphism class, it is highly unlikely — a probability of about 2−42 — that
the discrete log problem on Alice’s curve can be moved to a weak curve by a sequence of isogenies.
In other words, what saves Alice from Bob’s fate is precisely the very special nature of her curve.6
Most practical implementations of ECC in characteristic two use prime extension degrees, in which
case Weil descent appears not to be useful (see [77]). However, it is not inconceivable that either a
new version of Weil descent or some entirely different approach will some day lead to a faster-than-
squareroot attack on a certain small (but non-negligible) proportion of elliptic curves deﬁned over Fq ,
where q is a prime power of 2. If we are using a curve over this ﬁeld when this happens, we had
better hope that our curve cannot be linked to a weak curve by means of isogenies.
Example 4. In 2000 in its Digital Signature Standard [86], NIST recommended ten elliptic curves over
binary ﬁelds F2 with  = 163, 233, 283, 409, 571. For each  they gave one random curve and
one anomalous binary curve. The security level in the face of squareroot attacks is roughly 2/2.7
For instance, both curves over F2571 should provide more than the 256 bits of security necessary to
protect a high-security Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) private key.
This raises the question: Which of the two NIST curves over F2571 is safer? The conventional wis-
dom would be that the random curve is the more conservative choice.
However, let us suppose that a certain very small — but not negligible — fraction  of curves over
this ﬁeld could be attacked by some new faster-than-squareroot algorithm. We further suppose that
the property of being a “weak” curve is independent of isogeny class or endomorphism class. In such
6 In this discussion we are ignoring Gaudry’s recent algorithm [32] for the discrete log on an elliptic curve over Fqm , m 3
(see Section 10.2). However, in Section 4.4 of [32] Gaudry says that, based on experimental results, he expects that his algorithm
for m = 3 will be faster than Pollard-rho only for q > 265. In our example q = 259, so at present we need not concern ourselves
with Gaudry’s algorithm. But of course improved implementations could result in that algorithm beating Pollard-rho in our case
as well.
7 The actual security achieved with anomalous binary curves is a little less because of the speed-up of the Pollard-rho attack
by
√
.
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of O (1/) isogenies, an attacker can move the discrete log problem to a weak curve. A random curve
is virtually certain to be in a large endomorphism class (since the discriminant of a random curve is
very unlikely to be divisible by a large square). In particular, this is true of the random NIST curve
over F2571 , whose discriminant is squarefree, i.e., all isogenous curves are in the same endomorphism
class [47]. In contrast, the anomalous binary curve K-571 in [86] has discriminant  = −7c20, where
the conductor c0 is the product of a 22-bit prime and a 263-bit prime, and its endomorphism ring
has conductor 1. For L = 2262 the L-conductor-gap class of the curve K-571 has approximately 222
curves, so if   2−22, this curve is likely to be safer than a random curve under our assumptions.
Weil descent methods are not applicable to curves deﬁned over a prime ﬁeld. But suppose that we
are worried about the possibility that some new approach to the discrete log problem will turn out
to give faster-than-squareroot algorithms for a certain proportion of curves deﬁned over Fp . Suppose
also that the condition for a curve to be “weak” is likely to be independent of its isogeny or endo-
morphism class. In such a case we might want to choose our curve E over Fp to be in a very small
endomorphism class — more precisely, in a small L-conductor-gap class for fairly large L — so that
an attacker could not use isogenies to transport the discrete log problem from our curve to a weak
curve.
Example 5. Choose B to be a random k-bit prime, and choose A to be a random even number (per-
haps also of k bits, but A may be chosen to have fewer bits) such that (i) p = A2 + B2 is prime, and
(ii) either n = (p + 1)/2− A or n = (p + 1)/2+ A is a prime. Heuristically one expects to have to test
O (k2) values of A in order to obtain conditions (i) and (ii). Then the curve E over Fp with equation
y2 = x3 − αx
has 2n points, where α ∈ Fp is a quadratic non-residue whose quartic residue class depends on the
sign in n = (p + 1)/2∓ A (see Sections 9.8 and 18.4 of [45]). The trace of E is ±2A, and its discrim-
inant is 4A2 − 4p = −4B2. Because B is prime, for k  80 it is completely infeasible to transport the
discrete log problem on E to that on a generic isogenous curve. Note that E has complex multiplica-
tion by the full ring of integers Z[i] (since i acts on the curve by (x, y) → (−x, iy), where the latter
occurrence of i denotes a square root of −1 in the ﬁnite ﬁeld); that is, End(E) has conductor 1. Up to
isomorphism E is the only curve in its conductor-gap class, and the endomorphism ring of any of the
other isogenous curves has conductor B .
The method of parameter selection in this example of course directly ﬂouts the advice of Brain-
pool [73]. But whether it is reckless or wise to do this is at present far from clear.
Our purpose in giving these examples is not to lobby for the use of special curves in preference to
random ones. Rather, our point is that conventional wisdom may turn out to be wrong and that, as
far as anyone knows, either choice has risks. The decision about what kind of curve to use in ECC is
a subjective one based on the user’s best guess about future vulnerabilities.
As frequently happens in cryptography, a close examination of a commonly accepted viewpoint
on security issues reveals that opposing opinions or interpretations cannot be ruled out. Much as
we might wish to convey to the outside world an impression of self-conﬁdence and mathematical
certainty about our recommendations (see Section 2), there is ample reason to wonder whether this
self-conﬁdence is justiﬁed.
12. Path dependence
In [74] MacKenzie and Wajcman discuss what they call the path-dependence of technical change:
Technologies often manifest increasing returns to adoption. The processes of learning by doing and
by using. . . and the frequent focus of inventive effort on removing weak points. . . from existing
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technologies that are adopted. This gives the history, especially the early history, of a technology
considerable signiﬁcance. Early adoptions, achieved for whatever reason, can be built into what
may become irreversible superiority over rivals, because success tends to breed success and re-
jection can turn into neglect and therefore permanent inferiority. The history of technology is a
path-dependent history, one in which past events exercise continuing inﬂuences. Which of two or
more technologies eventually succeeds is not determined by their intrinsic characteristics alone,
but also by their histories of adoption. The technology that triumphs is not necessarily abstractly
best. . . . Path-dependence means that local, short-term contingencies can exercise lasting effects.
12.1. Historical what–ifs
One of the best ways to refute the technological deterministic view of the history of cryptography
that is implicit in the Ideal Model (see the last paragraph of Section 2) is to indulge in what is
sometimes called “counterfactual history” (see [19,27]) and ask some hypothetical questions of the
form “What if. . . ?”
• What if in 1977 someone who had just written a PhD thesis on elliptic curves had happened to
read the classic article [24] that had appeared the year before? Fortunately for RSA, that appears not
to have happened, since it probably would have occurred to such a person to suggest replacing the
multiplicative group of a ﬁnite ﬁeld by the group of points of an elliptic curve, and ECC would have
been born eight years before 1985. In 1977 subexponential algorithms were already known for the
integer factorization problem. The elliptic curve discrete log problem thus would have struck everyone
as a much harder problem, and hence the one-way function in ECC would have appeared to be much
safer for the construction of public key protocols. There would have been little reason for anyone to
adopt RSA.
• What if the ideas described in Section 10 for ﬁnding discrete logs on an elliptic curve E over Fqm —
Weil descent followed by index calculus on a jacobian group, or index calculus directly on E using
points with x-coordinate in Fq as the factor base — had been proposed in the late 1980s or early
1990s? At that time it was generally assumed that any ﬁnite ﬁeld could be used in ECC, and the
choice should depend only on convenience. In fact, some people proposed using ﬁelds of the form
Fqm with q a prime or a power of 2 of intermediate size (say, 8 or 32 bits). The faster-than-squareroot
and even subexponential algorithms for some elliptic curves over such “weak” ﬁelds would have come
as a shock, and opponents of ECC could have easily used the discovery of such algorithms as a reason
not to have conﬁdence in elliptic curves. As it happened, however, by the late 1990s implementers
were almost exclusively using either prime ﬁelds or prime degree extensions of F2, to which those
algorithms do not apply.
• What if pairing-based cryptography had been proposed just three or four years earlier, say in 1997
when “ECC Central” on the RSA website was warning of the dangers of ECC? The elliptic curve skeptics
would have had a ﬁeld day! “The ECC promoters are now using the very same low-embedding-degree
elliptic curves that ﬁve years ago they acknowledged to be insecure and recommended avoiding!” they
would have said. Some people would have hoped that by undermining conﬁdence in pairing-based
cryptography they might be able to bring down all of ECC with it. However, by 2001 the big rivalry
between RSA and ECC was largely over, and hardly anyone wanted to reopen that debate.
These hypothetical questions show that the particular chronology of RSA, ECC, pairing-based cryp-
tography, and new algorithms for factoring and discrete logs has a lot to do with the history of the
paradigm shift to ECC.
12.2. Narrative inversion
In historical studies one often ﬁnds a wide gap between the image that a nation or group has of
its past — the historical narrative — and what the record shows. In extreme cases it sometimes seems
that the farther this narrative is from reality, the more adamantly people repeat it and insist on its
validity. This is narrative inversion.
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principle of its foreign policy has been to “defend freedom.” Even though people in other countries
might see an ever-widening chasm between this national myth and the reality, the narrative continues
to be a centerpiece of the belief system of millions of people, who proclaim it with increasing fervor.
In the world of scholarship as well, one often encounters narrative inversion. Take, for example,
the word science. Often the humanistic and social areas whose practitioners are the most insistent
on using this word are those ﬁelds that have the worst track record in attempting to use scientiﬁc
methodology. In the last century the term “social studies” was replaced by “social sciences,” and de-
partments of government became departments of “political science.” Interestingly, the one profession
in social studies that arguably uses a fair amount of scientiﬁc methodology and does it competently —
history — has never insisted on changing its name to “historical science.”
12.3. Narrative inversion in cryptography
Modern cryptography can be viewed as an applied science in the overlap between mathematics
and computer science. Nevertheless, the development of various technologies for implementing secure
communications continues to be as much a story of chance occurrences, mistaken interpretations,
zigzags, blunders, and strokes of good luck as was the cryptography of old. It seems impossible to
remove the element of contingency — of intuition and of craft.
Part of the reason why cryptography has such a strong subjective element is that speculation is
central to the ﬁeld. When deciding on the basic type of cryptography to use (RSA or ECC, for example),
when choosing the type of protocol for a given application (e.g., whether or not to use identity-
based encryption), and when selecting parameters (for instance, random generation versus enhanced
eﬃciency), one has to make a guess about future developments in order to evaluate the fundamental
issue of safety of the system. One has to ask: What type of adversaries are we likely to encounter, and
what will be their most likely avenues of attack? Will there be any breakthroughs in bringing down
the asymptotic running time to solve any of the supposedly intractable mathematical problems? Will
quantum computing (see [95]) ever become practical? What new “side-channel” attacks (see [2,9,63,
64]) might be devised?
Perhaps it is because of this highly contingent element in the ﬁeld that researchers increasingly
feel the need to go out of their way to assure the public that it is rapidly becoming a science, that
ironclad guarantees of security can be given (“provable security”), and that cryptographers faithfully
follow the Ideal Model described in Section 2.
Among the leading researchers in cryptography, Mihir Bellare (coinventor of the subdiscipline of
practice-oriented provable security) has a relatively moderate view of the scientiﬁc nature of the ﬁeld.
On the one hand, he acknowledges that the search for suitable mathematical one-way functions —
what he calls atomic primitives — has a large element of artistry [6]. But on the other hand, he thinks
that the part of cryptography concerned with constructing usable cryptosystems based on these prim-
itives is becoming a science:
. . . I would like to claim that the design of protocols can be made a science [6].
Other theoreticians, writing more recently, are categorical in their rejection of any notion that cryp-
tography is not fully a science. In response to comments in [60] questioning the claims of “provable
security” and suggesting that cryptography is “more an art than a science,” Oded Goldreich [35] stated
that
. . . cryptographic research is indeed part of science. [emphasis in original]
And in the preface to their recent book [49] Jonathan Katz and Yehuda Lindell insisted that
. . . cryptographic constructions can be proven secure with respect to a clearly-stated deﬁnition of se-
curity and relative to a well-deﬁned cryptographic assumption. This is the essence of modern
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this idea cannot be over-emphasized. [emphasis in original]
As in other cases of narrative inversion, these belabored claims inevitably bring to mind the famous
line from Hamlet
The lady doth protest too much, methinks.
13. Social construction of science and technology
Until the work of Thomas Kuhn a half century ago, the term Scientiﬁc Revolution, used in the
singular, referred to the birth of modern science in the 16th and 17th centuries. Kuhn, whose most
famous book [68] appeared in 1962, used the term “scientiﬁc revolutions” in the plural to refer to the
radical shifts of point of view that have punctuated the history of science. It was Kuhn who coined
the term “paradigm shift” for this process — a term that was later used in many areas outside the
sciences.
Before Kuhn’s work, the most common view among historians was that science and technology
progressed steadily toward a more accurate and complete understanding of the natural world. Mis-
takes were often made — and one could frequently ﬁnd social and political explanations for the
backward steps — but the overall pattern was to build upon the ediﬁce constructed by earlier gener-
ations, “standing on the shoulders of giants” in Newton’s famous formulation.
Kuhn, however, believed that the most important developments in the history of science occur by
means of a radical challenge to earlier conceptions. In his view social and professional inﬂuences have
a great effect on the direction of science as a whole, and should not be invoked simply to explain the
“mistakes.” In fact, he believed in what later came to be called the “symmetry principle,” which states
that historians should use the same methods to study the emergence of a scientiﬁc theory or school
of thought independently of whether modern science regards the theory as correct or incorrect.
In the years after Kuhn’s book appeared, this methodological principle was carried much further
by other historians and philosophers, who started advocating a type of scientiﬁc relativism, according
to which science has no more objective validity than anything else. Science, according to this view, is
“socially constructed” just as literature, politics, and religion are. The relativist tendency in thinking
about science was most pronounced among postmodernists such as Jacques Lacan, Paul Feyerabend,
Vandana Shiva, and Bruno Latour.
In the 1980s and 1990s as this tendency grew in strength among academics in the humanities
and social studies, some scientists started to take notice. Most reacted with horror and anger at what
the postmodern writers were saying. Some, such as Holton [41] and Gross and Levitt [37], published
refutations. Journalists often referred to the debate as the “science wars.”
The culmination of the scientists’ counterattack on postmodern writings on science came in the
form of a hoax — perhaps the most successful hoax in the history of academic writing. After two
months of studying the relevant literature, physicist Alan Sokal wrote a parody of the postmodern
science studies jargon in the form of an article on the “hermeneutics” of quantum gravity. He sub-
mitted it to the journal Social Text for publication. Astoundingly, the caricature was accepted, and his
article [101] appeared in the Spring/Summer 1996 issue of the journal.
Sokal’s hoax and subsequent critiques [14,102] were directed against an extreme form of “science
studies.” But even the more moderate sociologists of science sometimes write in a style that reveals an
unmistakable undercurrent of resentment and pique toward the sciences and technology. For example,
in his introduction to the book “Technology and Social Process,” B. Elliott [26] says:
Running through many of the chapters in this book. . . there is a concern to demystify technology.
The social studies of science have shown us that the closer we get to the laboratories, to the day-
to-day practice of science, and the more intimately we explore the social processes through which
scientiﬁc knowledge is constituted, the less in awe of it we stand. We appreciate the looseness
of its boundaries, the contested nature of its claims. Scientiﬁc research turns out to be much
messier than we had perhaps supposed, its development less the product of logical and rational
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In consequence we grow more skeptical of claims that may be made for its special, privileged
status and more critical of various forms of scientiﬁc determinism. And so it is, and should be,
with technology.
It is tempting for scientists to revel in Sokal’s spoof of the nonsensical jargon of the postmod-
ernists, react with annoyance to the tone of sociologists of science such as Elliott, and dismiss as
ridiculous any attempt to describe a school of scientiﬁc thought as a “social construct.” But that
would be a mistake.
There have been many studies of the effects of such social factors as race, class, and gender on
the content of scientiﬁc theories. In some areas of the sciences — especially those connected with hu-
man behavior — and in many areas of technology these studies have exposed serious methodological
failings.
This work in the history and sociology of science and technology on occasion can be fascinating —
and it can be especially entertaining when gender bias is involved. In the sciences the inﬂuence of
gender has been most pronounced in such ﬁelds as primatology, endocrinology, embryology, archae-
ology, and sociobiology. We will give brief (and admittedly superﬁcial) descriptions of three examples.
13.1. Gorillas
The ﬁeld of primatology emerged toward the end of the 19th century in the wake of Darwin’s
pathbreaking work on natural selection and evolution, which was popularly known as the theory that
“man descended from apes.” For close to a century most primatologists visualized ape family life as
conforming to Victorian views of gender roles. A now-classic example of this tendency could be seen
in the primate hall of the American Museum of Natural History, which featured a majestic male silver-
back gorilla towering over and guarding his much smaller mate and their offspring. This memorable
tableau directly replicated the stereotypical Victorian nuclear family in the primate world. Unstated
anywhere in the exhibit was the fact that several large female gorillas had been shot in the mistaken
belief that they were males worthy of being stuffed for the Museum. Unstated also was the fact that
such a scene of a nuclear ape family would have been highly unlikely in nature [38,39]. It was not un-
til the 1960s and 1970s, with the rise of second-wave feminism and the entrance of a new generation
of women into the profession, that primatologists began to systematically question the patriarchal as-
sumptions of their older colleagues and point out that primates exhibit a surprising variety of social
organizations, parenting strategies, dominance hierarchies, and male/female relations [42,104].
13.2. The Hohokam
A more recent and equally amusing example of gender bias can be found in a currently fashionable
trend in the study of the prehistoric Southwest of the U.S. A group of archaeologists led by Steven
LeBlanc of Harvard and David Wilcox of the Museum of Northern Arizona have developed an elaborate
theory of endemic warfare among the ancient Hohokam peoples of central Arizona (see [52,53]).
Wilcox and his coauthors describe how, while talking late at night around a campﬁre, they arrived
at their “exciting” conclusions, which seem to be the result of lively imagination stimulated by male-
to-male comradery rather than any scholarly deductions. They recount with awe and describe as
“scientiﬁc” the “seminal ideas” supplied by a much-decorated veteran of the Vietnam War who visited
the sites with Wilcox. Although there is scant evidence for any warfare among the Hohokam, let alone
battles of epic proportions, this group of archaeologists has insisted on a version of prehistory that
appears to have more to do with a modern American culture of aggressive masculinity than with the
actual interactions among peoples in 14th-century Arizona.
13.3. Smart houses
Examples of gender bias abound in technology. For example, the much-hyped “smart house” was
analyzed in a delightful article by Anne-Jorunn Berg [7]. On the face of it, one would expect that
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primary users of technology within the home. Berg found, however, that “smart house” designers
had been remarkably uninterested in grappling with such labor-intensive activities as cooking, clean-
ing and childcare. Instead, designers had concentrated on getting peripheral technologies to “talk” to
one another through central control stations: getting lights to turn on automatically, arranging voice-
activated controls for entertainment systems, etc. The closest any of the projects had come to a basic
household task was the “robobutler,” which could supposedly serve drinks. But the drinks must ﬁrst
be made by a human and set precisely on the robobutler’s tray, at which point the robobutler could
be remotely guided into the livingroom by controls much like those used for toy boats and planes.
In other words, this technology was a “toy for the boys” rather than a true labor-saving advance. The
core tasks that make housework so time-consuming remained untouched.
13.4. The social study of technology
The social study of technology has become a subﬁeld in its own right relatively recently — a decade
or two after the emergence of the social study of science. Sociologists of technology have usually
avoided the pitfalls of jargon and over-generalization that have plagued writers on the social con-
struction of science. In part this is a conscious strategy adopted in order to avoid a repetition of the
“science wars.” In the preface to the 1999 edition of their book [74] MacKenzie and Wajcman warn
their colleagues not to repeat the mistakes of sociologists of science:
We fear a rerun in the social studies of technology of what has happened in the social studies of
science. There, in the 1970s and 1980s, a variety of empirical studies. . . offered evidence that the
content of scientiﬁc knowledge was inﬂuenced by the social circumstances of its production. . . .
Those who produced this work knew well that the evidence was partial, tentative and patchy,
and that the conceptual issues involved were poorly understood, but a wider audience of scholars
in the humanities and social sciences grasped eagerly at the conclusion that scientiﬁc knowledge
was ‘a social construct.’ The notion became something of a premature orthodoxy, and too little was
done to clarify what the ambiguous phrase meant. . . . In consequence, when some natural scientists
reacted with hostility to the notion of social construction (in the ‘science wars’ debate. . . ), the ﬁeld
was not as well placed as it might have been.
In addition, it is easier for sociologists of technology to get a sympathetic reception from prac-
titioners, because most leaders of the ﬁeld are fully conscious of the role that economic, social and
political factors play in the adoption of certain technologies and the rejection of others. A famous
example was Thomas Edison (see [43,44]), who was as much an entrepreneur as an inventor. Few
technologists would see their work as being entirely removed from the cultural environment. In con-
trast, researchers in the basic sciences — especially the physical sciences and mathematics — tend to
see their work as a process of discovering a set of truths that transcend the exigencies of the moment.
However theoreticians in math and physics might view their work, practitioners in applied ﬁelds
such as cryptography would have to be very naive in order to believe that their ideas and protocols
have some sort of intrinsic value apart from human culture. It is quite a stretch to visualize RSA or
ECC inhabiting a realm of Platonic Ideals side by side with the perfect circle, the Pythagorean theorem,
and the Heisenberg uncertainty principle.
13.5. Conclusion
To what extent can ideas from “social construction of technology” help us to understand the
paradigm shift from RSA to ECC? Certain broad social categories do not appear to be relevant to
this history; to the best of our knowledge questions of gender, race, or class have nothing to do with
this story. It is perhaps particularly surprising that gender has played no discernible role, since the
popular history of cryptography is intimately tied up with the military and is full of male-dominated
stories of intrigue. Nevertheless, we are aware of no examples of gender, race, or class bias inﬂuencing
the direction of public key cryptography.
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ﬁeld — any more than in other areas of computer science, engineering, and mathematics. In fact, the
proportion of prominent women researchers is probably greater than that in most of the allied ﬁelds
of science. This ﬂies in the face of some currently popular notions about women in science, accord-
ing to which women by nature avoid ﬁelds where conﬂict and confrontation are common (see, for
example, [5,34]). In the case of cryptography, adversarial behavior is central to the very deﬁnition of
the subject, and the “spy vs. spy” mentality of intense rivalry often seems to permeate the research
community as well. Heated disputes might involve the relative merits of different types of cryptog-
raphy or of different approaches to evaluating them, or such mundane matters as which of several
contending research groups deserves credit for advancing a particular subﬁeld.
Just as we reject technological determinism, we should also avoid a type of equally simplistic
sociological determinism that is sometimes called essentialism. In thinking about disciplines such as
cryptography, some feminist theoreticians would reason more or less as follows: “Women by their
nature are less confrontational and militaristic than men, and hence are less likely to be attracted to a
ﬁeld whose entire purpose is to combat adversarial behavior.” And postmodern feminist philosophers
of science would also see a gender subtext in the debate over whether cryptography is more a science
or an art. They would most likely claim that the very term “science” is so tied to masculinity that
some cryptographers’ ﬁxation on the word “science” to describe their ﬁeld (see Section 12.3) is prima
facie evidence of a male bias. (See [51] for a discussion of some of the fallacies in postmodern feminist
views of science.)
Similarly, in trying to explain the dramatic contrast between the recommendations of Brainpool
and of Voltage (see Section 11) some might be tempted to resort to popular stereotypes of national
character: “Germans are risk-averse by nature, whereas Americans have a penchant for high-stakes
gambling, so that is why German-led Brainpool was extra-cautious, whereas the American security
company Voltage happily endorsed a supersingular curve.” In our opinion such attempts at explana-
tion based on gender or national character are far-fetched and untenable.
The social inﬂuences on the course of public key cryptography appear to have come not from
such broad categories as gender, race, class, or nationality, but rather from certain aspects of the
professional culture. This is not unusual in the history of technology. As MacKenzie and Wajcman put
it,
. . . ‘social shaping’ does not necessarily involve reference to wider societal relations such as those
of class, gender and ethnicity. These are sometimes directly crucial. . . but often what is more
immediately relevant are ‘local’ considerations, such as engineers’ membership of professional
communities, the reward structures of those communities, and so on [74, pp. 18–19].
Our examination of the history of ECC offers no support to those who would argue that technology
follows an inevitable path that is independent of societal constraints. Rather, the evidence points
toward ways in which technology is socially constructed:
• path-dependence — the importance of timing, the role of happenstance;
• the role of themilitary in intervening at crucial stages to send the technology in a different direction
from that favored by market forces;
• closure — the need eventually to reach a consensus and stop most debate, even if some basic
questions remain unanswered;
• narrative inversion — a desire to use high-status terms such as “science” and “mathematical proof”
that becomes more fervent even as the ﬁeld is showing itself again and again to be as much an
art as a science.
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